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"VTOLUNTARY" INTERVIEWS AND
AIRPORT SEARCHES OF MIDDLE
EASTERN MEN: THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT IN A TIME OF TERROR
Tracey Maclin*
INTRODUCTION

The tragic and horrible events of September 11, 2001 have
changed the terms and direction of the debate regarding the
use of race and ethnicity by law enforcement officers. Before
the terrorist attacks on September 11, presidential and gubernatorial candidates were tripping over each other to condemn
racial profiling by law enforcement officers.' Prior to Septem" Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. I want to
thank
Professor Tom Clancy for inviting me to speak at the University of Mississippi
School of Law and to attend a symposium entitled, The Permissibility of Race or
Ethnicity as a Factor in Assessing the Reasonableness of a Search or Seizure. I
also want to thank the National Center for Justice and the Rule of Law at the
University of Mississippi School of Law that is supported by a grant from the
Bureau of Justice Assistance, Office of Justice Programs, of the United States
Department of Justice, for its generous support of this article.
Republican presidential candidate George W. Bush denounced racial profiling during a presidential debate, saying he could not "imagine what it would be
like to be singled out because of race, and stopped and harassed. It's just flat
wrong, and that's not what America is all about, and so we ought to do everything we can to end racial profiling." The Presidential Debate, L.A. TIMES, Oct.
10, 2000, at A14. Likewise, Democratic presidential candidate Al Gore claimed to
support a ban on racial profiling "whether it's African Americans, Arab Americans, whatever." Ceci Connolly & Mike Allen, Gore Rips Bush Claims on Budget,
Hate Crimes, WASH. POST, Oct. 15, 2000, at A10. In New Jersey, Democratic and
Republican gubernatorial candidates also spoke out against racial profiling during
their campaigns. See Jonathan Schuppe, Gubernatorial Candidates Offer Ways To
Combat Racial Profiling, STAR-LEDGER (Newark), Aug. 3, 2001, at 23 (noting Republican Bret Schundler's plan to outlaw consent searches until the state police
established court-ordered monitoring system over police practices as well as Democrat Jim McGreevey's support for a racial profiling criminal statute). For a discussion of the definitional problems of "racial profiling," see generally Deborah A.
Ramirez et al.,
Defining Racial Profiling in a Post September 11 World, 40 AM.
CRIM. L. REv. 1195, 1204 (2003). See also Sharon L. Davies, Profiling Terror, 1
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 45, 48 (2003) ("Generally speaking, racial profiling occurs
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ber 11, many Americans believed that racial profiling was
unacceptable police work and prejudicial to racial minorities.2
Even a few law enforcement agencies and individual police
officers conceded that racial profiling had fundamental defects.'
After September 11, public opinion on racial and ethnic
profiling changed precipitously. After learning that nineteen

when an officer's decision of whom to stop and question for suspected criminal
activity proceeds from the individual's race or ethnicity itself. In such a case, it is
the individual's race or ethnicity that attracts the officer's interest or suspicion.
From that point of suspicion the officer may then be motivated to engage in
pretextual behavior to justify the individual's stop or arrest."). For an excellent
post-September 11 discussion of racial and ethnic profiling-when it should be
permissible and impermissible and a critique of the constitutional doctrine related
to the topic, see generally Albert W. Alschuler, Racial Profiling and the Constitution, 2002 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 163. When it comes to defining racial profiling, Professor Alschuler notes that "opponents of racial profiling often have failed to define the term, and the definitions provided by legislatures and scholars have differed substantially." Id. at 168 (footnote omitted).
' Specifically, according to a December 1999 Gallup Poll, eighty-one percent of
the public disapproved of racial profiling. See Florangela Davila, ACLU Ads to
Spotlight "Racial Profiling" Issue, SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 20, 2000, at B5. Of course,
not everyone disapproved of racial profiling by police officers or believed that
racial profiling had become a phenomenon dangerously out of control. See Samuel
Gross & Debra Livingston, Racial Profiling Under Attack, 102 COLUM. L. REV.
1413, 1422 n.38 (2002) (citing "conservative commentators" who defended racial
profiling on practical grounds); Robert H. Bork, Civil Liberties After 9/11, FRONT
PAGE MAGAZINE, July 4, 2003 (stating that "there is by and large no evidence
that police have relied excessively on ethnic or racial profiling in conducting their
normal investigations"), available at http://www.frontpagemag.com/articles/ Printable.asp?ID=8758.
' See, e.g., Peter Verniero & Paul H. Zoubek, Office of the Attorney Gen. of
N.J., Interim Report of the State Police Review Team Regarding Allegations of
Racial Profiling 4 (1999) [hereinafter Interim Report] (explaining that "minority
motorists have been treated differently than non-minority motorists during the
course of traffic stops on the New Jersey Turnpike" and concluding that "the
problem of disparate treatment is real-not imagined"); see also Albert W.
Alschuler, supra note 1 (noting additional instances of government officials and
judicial bodies criticizing racial profiling); James H. Burnett III, Feingold Bill
Would Ban Racial Profiling; Proposal Sent to Bush has Police Chiefs' Support,
MILWAUKEE JOURNAL-SENTINEL, June 19, 2001, at 3; Kate Grusich, Lake County
Police Develop Plan to Prevent Racial Profiling, DAILY HERALD (Chicago), Jan. 13,
2001, at 5; Mark Mathis, Local Police Condemn Racial Profiling, AUGUSTA
CHRONICLE, Mar. 4, 2000, at A7; David L. Teibel, Napolitano Praised For Profiling Guidelines, TUCSON CITIZEN, May 28, 2001, at 1C; Stephen Thompson, Police
Stand Against Racial Profiling, TAMPA TRIBUNE, May 12, 2001, at 2.
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Middle Eastern men were responsible for September 11, many
Americans reconsidered their views on racial profiling.4 Profiling blacks or Latinos on the highways is still opposed by the
average citizen, but profiling young, Middle Eastern or Islamic
men at airports or other high-risk security venues is now
favored by many Americans.' Columnists Stuart Taylor and
Charles Krauthammer, for example, have specifically urged.
the targeting of Middle Eastern airline passengers.' Even
Floyd Abrams, the nation's most prominent First Amendment
lawyer and a zealous defender of the Bill of Rights, has endorsed giving airport officials the authority to consider the

ethnicity of select non-citizens during security checks.7

See generally Joyce Purnick, Last Week Profiling Was Wrong, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 15, 2001, at AS; Sam Howe Verhovek, A Nation Challenged: Civil Liberties;
Americans Give in to Race Profiling, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2001, at Al; see also
DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS 48 (2003) (noting that after September 11, "polls
reported that nearly 60 percent of the American public favored ethnic profiling, at
least as long as it was directed at Arabs and Muslims"); Alschuler, supra note 1,
at 163-64 (describing the post-September 11 "shift in sentiment" towards racial
profiling).
' But cf. Alschuler, supra note 1, at 223-30 (criticizing arguments that distinguish profiling of blacks from profiling of Arabs and Muslims at airports);
Ramirez, et al., supra note 1, at 1226-30 (offering several arguments why profiling of Arabs and Muslims at airports would be ineffective police work and counter-productive to deterring terrorism); Davis Harris, Is this a Terrorist? (or Just a
Mindset), BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 10, 2002, at C2 (arguing against reliance on ethnicity when looking for terrorists).
, Charles Krauthammer, The Case for Profiling, TIME, Mar. 18, 2002, at 104;
Stuart Taylor, Jr., Politically Incorrect Profiling: A Matter of Life or Death, NATVL
J., Nov. 3, 2001, available at 2001 WL 25926324; see also Fedwa Malti-Douglas,
Let Them Profile Me, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2002, at A21.
[i]t is a fact that the particular terrorist group sworn to our destruction,
Al Qaeda, is made up largely of Middle Easterners. It is not unreasonable
to direct increased attention to passengers with some connection to the
Middle East.
Arab-Americans like me want to be safe when we fly. Cooperating
with security procedures, even when we suspect that we are getting more
attention than our fellow citizens, makes sense. Does anyone really want
a security official to hesitate before stopping a suspicious passenger out of
fear of an accusation of bias?
Id.
7 According to Abrams, "lilt would be crazy not to consider what people look
like when we're looking for people who may be involved with hijackings ....
It
would be bizarre." CBS News: 60 Minutes (CBS television broadcast, Aug. 11,
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High-ranking members of the Bush Administration have
also subtly changed their positions on racial profiling. Within
days of the September 11 attacks, Attorney General John
Ashcroft stated that people at airports would not be considered terrorist "suspects based solely on their race and ethnic
origin."' Similarly, Federal Bureau of Investigation Director
Robert Mueller said, "[we do not, have not, [and] will not
target people based solely on their ethnicity, period... .' The

2002), available at 2002 WL 8424881. Abrams found "a big difference between
being interned and being searched a little more at an airport." Id. Abrams also
noted that the country had "been attacked, and the one thing that the attackers
[had] in common ...
[was] their national origin and their sex and their language." Id.; see also Floyd Abrams, The First Amendment and the War Against
Terrorism, 5 U. PA. J. CONsT. L. 1, 4-5 (2002) (explaining recommendation submitted by civil liberties advisory committee to Vice President Gore that airport
security officials be permitted to consider nationality of non-citizens: "It was preposterous, I thought, to tell airport officials not even to consider the citizenship of
visitors from any, say, Iran or Libya when deciding whom to search with particular intensity."); David Wallis, Questions for Floyd Abrams, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7,
2002, at 17 ("I'm afraid that I think that [privacy interests] should [yield to national security interests].").
" Fox News: Fox News Sunday (Fox television broadcast, Sept. 16, 2001),
available at 2001 WL 7790874.
' Eric Lichtblau & James Gerstenzang, After the Attack, L.A. TIMEs, Sept. 18,
2001, at A3. On June 17, 2003, the Justice Department, responding to directions
from President Bush, issued guidelines barring federal law enforcement officers
from using race or ethnicity in routine police operations and investigations. Justice Department Guidance Regarding the Use of Race by Federal Law Enforcement
Agencies,
June
17,
2003,
available
at
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/guidanceon~race.htm.
The
Guidelines
state:
In making routine or spontaneous law enforcement decisions, such as
ordinary traffic stops, federal law enforcement officers may not use race
or ethnicity to any degree, except that officers may rely on race and ethnicity if a specific suspect description exists. This prohibition applies even
where the use of race or ethnicity might otherwise be lawful.
Id. at 1. The Guidelines, however provide an exemption for investigations involving
terrorism and national security or "preventing catastrophic events." Id. at 8. In this
category of cases, federal officers may consider "race, ethnicity and other relevant
factors to the extent permitted by our laws and the Constitution." Id. at 8; see also
Eric Lichtblau, Bush Issues Federal Ban on Racial Profiling, N.Y. TIMEs, June 18,
2003, at Al.
Even assuming that federal law enforcement officers in the field will comply
with the President's guidelines and heed the announcements of the Attorney General and FBI Director not to target individuals at airports "solely" on their ethnicity, this safeguard is unlikely to deter explicit ethnic profiling by agents in the
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crucial term used by the Attorney General and the FBI Director is "solely." The Attorney General left no doubt that airport
security personnel would be permitted to consider a person's
ethnicity to determine whether to detain or search, but officials will not stop or search Arabs or Muslims based solely on
ethnicity or national origin. The bottom line is that racial and
ethnic profiling is no longer the evil concept it had been prior
to September 11, 2001.
Although racial profiling has generated considerable public attention in recent years," the law enforcement use of
race and ethnicity to target individuals for search or seizure
predates the Constitution." In the last few decades, the Supreme Court has tolerated racial and ethnic profiling and has
asserted that the Fourth Amendment does not impose constitutional restraints against profiling. In two significant cases
decided in the 1970s concerning border patrol operations, the
Court not only signaled that race and ethnicity are not forbidden criteria to determine the reasonableness of a search or
seizure, but it also expressly authorized ethnic-based seizures
at border checkpoints and locations near the border. 2 More

field. As Professor Randall Kennedy has recognized,
[elven if race is only one of several factors behind a decision, tolerating it
at all means tolerating it as potentially the decisive factor. In a close
case, it is a person's race which might make the difference between being
stopped by the police or being permitted to go on about one's business
free from governmental intrusion.
RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAw 148-49 (1997). See also Alschuler,
supra note 1, at 178 (noting case where a federal immigration supervisor "testified
that, in making roving-patrol stops, his subordinates considered, in addition to
Latino ethnicity, a 'dirty, unkempt appearance,' a 'lean and hungry look,' and wearing work clothes. When the government allows unkempt Anglos to proceed and
detain unkempt Latinos, it employs an ethnic classification." (footnotes and citations omitted)).
10 For a thorough critique of the usefulness of racial profiling and the harms
it has caused, see DAVID A. HARRIS, PROFILES IN INJUSTICE: WHY RACIAL PROFILING CANNOT WORK (2002).
I See Tracey Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amendment, 51 VAND. L. REV. 333,
334-36 (1998); see generally SALLY E. HADDEN, SLAVE PATROLS: LAW AND VIOLENCE IN VIRGINIA AND THE CAROLINAS (2001); William J. Cuddihy, The Fourth
Amendment: Origins and Original Meaning, 602-1791, at 432-54 (1990) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Claremont Graduate School).
1 See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976); United States v.
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recently, a unanimous Court in Whren v. United States 13 held
that pretextual traffic stops of black motorists do not implicate
the Fourth Amendment's guarantee against unreasonable
searches and seizures. ' Whren acknowledged that race-based
enforcement of traffic laws might violate the Constitution;
however, "the constitutional basis for objecting to intentionally
discriminatory application of laws is the Equal Protection
Clause, not the Fourth Amendment.""5 According to the

Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975). In Martinez-Fuerte, the Court held that the
Fourth Amendment allows the detention of vehicles at fixed checkpoints away
from the border even in the absence of individualized suspicion that a vehicle
contains illegal aliens. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 566-67. The Court also stated
that border agents could rely on the appearance of Mexican ancestry as justification for the selective referral of a motorist to a "secondary inspection" area for
interrogation. Id. at 563. Brignoni-Ponce invalidated the stop of a vehicle by border patrol agents solely on the basis of the occupants' Mexican ancestry. BrignoniPonce, 422 U.S. at 886-87. While the Court ruled that Mexican ancestry, standing
alone, did not provide reasonable suspicion to justify a detention, the Court stated
that the occupants' Mexican appearance is a relevant, but not dispositive, factor
in the reasonable suspicion equation needed for a valid stop under the Fourth
Amendment. Id. at 887. A student commentator has suggested that the Fourth
Amendment doctrine announced in Martinez-Fuerte and Brignoni-Ponce "will offer
little protection against [the] use of race as a factor in the search for terrorists."
Liam Braber, Comment, Korematsu's Ghost: A Post-September 11th Analysis of
Race and National Security, 47 VILL. L. REv. 451, 476 (2002) (stating that the
Court in "Brignoni-Ponce and Martinez-Fuerte indicated that the likelihood of an
individual of certain ancestry being involved in a certain crime was enough to
make that ancestry an 'objective criterion' to reasonable detention"); see also
Davies, supra note 1, at 62 n.68 (noting that "although it may be in [BrignoniPonce and Martinez-Fuerte] that Hispanic appearance is 'logically relevant,' there
are good reasons to question its 'legal relevance.' That is, even if the Hispanic
appearance of a car passenger near the border between the United States and
Mexico makes it minimally more likely that the car contains aliens illegally in
the country than it would be without that piece of evidence, in a state boasting a
sizeable Mexican-American population, the probative value of that ethnic information quickly diminishes to nearly zero."); HARRIS, supra note 10, at 132 ("The
Supreme Court's pronouncements in this area, combined with the universal stereotype of illegal immigrants as Latino, all but guarantee that police will use ethnicity in its crudest form, whether or not [police] agencies have immigration-related
responsibilities."). For a provocative discussion of Brignoni-Ponce and MartinezFuerte, and why border patrol agents should be free to consider ethnicity when
looking or illegal aliens in areas near the southern border, see Alschuler, supra
note 1, at 236-45.
13 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
14 Whren, 517 U.S. at 819.
I
Id.
at 813.
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Court, subjective intentions of law enforcement officials, including those based on racial stereotypes or bias, are irrelevant to Fourth Amendment analysis."6 Thus, if an officer has
probable cause for a traffic stop, it is inconsequential if the
officer's stop was motivated by racial or ethnic factors, rather
than legitimate traffic safety concerns. Probable cause of a
traffic violation, therefore,
insulates a police stop from Fourth
17
Amendment scrutiny.
The upshot of the Court's Fourth Amendment doctrine is
clear: government officials may consider race or ethnicity in
deciding whether to make a seizure during border patrol operations. Defendants and civil rights plaintiffs, however, cannot
rely on the Fourth Amendment for protection against racebased law enforcement practices. A critic might assert that
this framework amounts to a "win-win" situation for the government. In other forums, I have criticized the Court's Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence on issues pertaining to race." My
:6 Id.
' See David A. Sklansky, Traffic Stops, Minority Motorists, and the Future of
the Fourth Amendment, 1997 SuP. CT. REv. 271, 297 (1998) (noting that Whren
"cordon[s] off an entire category of 'circumstances' that might ordinarily be
thought pertinent to the reasonableness of an officer's actions [regarding a traffic

stop], and make[s] them irrelevant as a matter of law"). Of course, it is easy to
acquire "probable cause" for a traffic stop. See William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy
Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1,
7 (1997).
In a world ...

where routine traffic offenses count as crimes, the re-

quirement of probable cause to arrest may mean almost nothing. Officers
can arrest for a minor offense-everyone violates the traffic rules-in
order to search or question a suspect on a major one. This allows arrests
and searches of suspected drug dealers without any ex ante support for
the suspicion, the very thing the probable cause standard is supposed to
forbid.
Id.; see also David A. Harris, "Driving While Black" and All Other Traffic Offenses:
The Supreme Court and Pretextual Traffic Stops, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
544, 545 (1997).
In the most literal sense, no driver can avoid violating some traffic law
during a short drive, even with the most careful attention. Fairly read,
Whren says that any traffic violation can support a stop, no matter what
the real reason for it is; this makes any citizen fair game for a stop,
almost any time, anywhere, virtually at the whim of police.
Id.
Is See, e.g., Tracey Maclin, 'Black and Blue Encounters" Some Preliminary
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previous views, however, were formulated prior to the horrific
events of September 11, 2001. In this essay, I discuss two
examples of ethnic-based policing following September 11 and
articulate why these law enforcement practices are constitutionally impermissible.
First, I will discuss Attorney General John Ashcroft's
memorandum ordering law enforcement officers to interview a
list of five thousand young, alien men from mostly Middle
Eastern countries. Part I of this essay contends that the federal government's list amounts to ethnic profiling. Furthermore,
regardless of whether the government's list constitutes ethnic
profiling, Part I argues that the men targeted for "interviews"
most likely felt powerless to reject the government's request
for a "voluntary" interview. Although the men targeted for
interrogation probably felt coerced into submitting to interviews, these interrogation sessions are nonetheless considered
consensual encounters under current Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence.
The second example of ethnic profiling by law enforcement
is not currently the law, nor a de facto policy acknowledged by
government officials. Part II analyzes a proposal advocated by
Stuart Taylor, Charles Krauthammer and others that would
authorize airport security officials to select passengers for
additional security checks based on national origin. Although
Taylor and Krauthammer's proposal may appeal to our common sense and attempt to placate our fears of future terrorist
attacks, their proposal relies on the same premise that justified the detention of Japanese Americans and Japanese aliens
in federal concentration camps following the attack on Pearl
Harbor. Just as some Americans in the 1940s believed that
individuals of Japanese ancestry represented a threat to national security and could not be trusted to be loyal to the United States,19 today many believe that Middle Eastern and

Thoughts About Fourth Amendment Seizures: Should Race Matter?, 26 VAL. U. L.
REV. 243 (1991); Maclin, supra note 11; Tracey Maclin, Terry v. Ohio's Fourth
Amendment Legacy: Black Men and Police Discretion, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1271
(1998).
"9 See GREG ROBINSON, BY ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT: FDR AND THE INTERNMENT OF JAPANESE AMERICANS 3 (2001) ("Japanese Americans were singled out
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Muslim young men represent a threat as potential terrorists
and must be targeted for special scrutiny at the nation's airports.
PART I: "VOLUNTARY" INTERVIEWS

A. Was The Justice Department's "List"Ethnic Profiling?
Within weeks of the September 11 attacks, Attorney General Ashcroft ordered federal Anti-Terrorism Task Force officers and other law enforcement agents to interview approximately five thousand young aliens. The men were primarily
from Middle Eastern nations, between the ages of eighteen
and thirty-three years old and had arrived in the United
States sometime after January 1, 2000 on temporary student,
tourist or business visas. The State Department registered
and officially categorized these men as lawful residents of the
United States.2'
Attorney General Ashcroft later explained the Justice
Department's methodology for compiling the names of these
five thousand men: "The list was generated by taking a population of individuals and applying to that population a set of

from other 'enemy' groups such as Italian Americans and German Americans as
innately untrustworthy on racial grounds.").
"0 Florangela Davila & Mike Carter, Immigrants Urged to Exercise Rights, SEA7_1E TIMES, Nov. 21, 2001, at B1. On March 20, 2002, the Justice Department
announced a second round of interrogations of three thousand alien men, ages
eighteen to forty-six, who came to the United States between October 2001 and
February 2002 from nations where al Qaeda was operating. Id. The Department
conceded that the initial interview project questioned only half of the approximately five thousand men the Department targeted for interviews. See Philip
Shenon, Justice Dept. Wants to Query More Foreigners, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 21,
2002, at A19. Attorney General Ashcroft "acknowledged that the government's
failure to find many of the men on the original list demonstrated 'serious flaws'
in its ability to keep track of visitors to the United States." Id. He also noted
that the initial interrogations had generated "a significant number of leads for
investigators looking into the Sept. 11 attacks and other potential terrorist activities," but other Department officials conceded that the interrogations had produced no arrests involving the events of September 11 or terrorist activities. Id.
Approximately twenty persons had been arrested for immigrations violations. Id.;
see also New Round of Interviews Planned with Foreigners, WALL ST. J., Mar. 21,
2002, at 8; Jonathan Peterson, U.S. Will Interview More Foreigners in Fight on
Terrorism, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2002, at A20.
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generic parameters.... These individuals were selected for interviews because they fit the criteria of persons who might
have knowledge of foreign-based terrorists."2 The Attorney
General dismissed criticism that the federal government was
engaged in racial or ethnic profiling. "[Tihere is no place for
ethnic or religious stereotyping in this plan, or in this nation's
campaign against terrorism. Nor were these individuals selected because they are suspected of any criminal activity, and,
absent any other indication that they are criminals, they
should not be treated as such."22 The Attorney General further noted that "[t]hese individuals were not selected in order
to single out a particular ethnic or religious group, or to suggest that one ethnic or religious group is more prone to terrorism than another. I emphatically reject that proposition..... "
Following the release of the Attorney General's memorandum, FBI agents and local police officials received the following guidelines for conducting the interrogations:
Since the persons to be interviewed are not suspected of
involvement in criminal activity, the interviews will be conducted on a consensual basis, and every interview subject
("individual") will be free to decline to answer questions. In
approaching the individual, you should announce your name,
title and law enforcement agency, clearly explain the purpose

" Memorandum

from the Attorney General, to all United States Attorneys

and all Members of the Anti-Terrorism Task Forces (Nov. 9, 2001) [hereinafter
at
http://www.usdoj.gov/ag
Interview
Memorandum],
General's
Attorney

readingroom/terrorisml.htm.

' Id.; see also Jodi Wilgoren, A Nation Challenged: The Interviews; Prosecutors
Begin Effort to Interview 5,000, but Basic Questions Remain, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15,
2001, at B7. Later, the head of the Criminal Division of the Justice Department,
Assistant Attorney General Michael Chertoff, told the Senate Judiciary Committee

that the interviews were not ethnic profiling. Chertoff asserted, "We have emphatically rejected ethnic profiling. What we have looked to are characteristics like
country of issuance of passport. . . ." DOJ Oversight: Preserving Our Freedoms
While Defending Against Terrorism: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2001) (statement of Michael Chertoff, Assistant Attorney
General, Criminal Division).
"' Attorney General's Interview Memorandum, supra note 21; see also Naftali
Bendavid, Interview Letters Go to 500 in Michigan, CHI. TRiB., Nov. 27, 2001, at
1.
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of the interview, and ask permission to speak with the individual. As these interviews will not be "custodial interrogations," there is no need to seek a waiver of Miranda rights.
Unless the individual prefers to conduct the interview
away from his home, workplace or neighborhood, you should
ordinarily not ask him to accompany you to the police station
or the field office. A number of these individuals may have
difficulty with the English language and little understanding
of our criminal justice system, and we want them and the
other members of their communities clearly to understand
that they are not being taken into custody and that the interviews are being pursued on a consensual basis. 2'
On November 12, 2001, Ralph Boyd, Jr., the Assistant
Attorney General for Civil Rights, and Jeffrey Collins, the
United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Michigan,
held a news conference to discuss how the Justice Department
would conduct the interrogations in Michigan. Due to the large
number of Middle Eastern men located in the state of Michigan, the Justice Department would send letters "inviting" these
men to come to "voluntary" interviews, as opposed to having investigators knock on doors at the homes of Arab men. At the
news conference, Collins read a portion of the letter which
stated:
Your name was brought to our attention because, among
other things, you came to Michigan on a visa from a country
where there are groups that support, advocate, or finance
international terrorism....
While this interview is voluntary, it is crucial that the
investigation be broad based and thorough, and the interview
is important to achieve that goal. We need to hear from you

24

Memorandum from the Attorney General, to all United States Attorneys

and all Members of the Anti-Terrorism Task Forces (Nov. 9, 2001) [hereinafter
Attorney
General's
Guideline
Memorandum],
available
at
http://www.usdoj.gov/04foia/readingrooms/terrorism2.htm. To highlight the consensual nature of the interviews, a spokeswoman for the Justice Department compared
the questioning to a neighborhood canvass after a murder stating, "This is a
preventive effort, focused on information gathering ....
The instructions are
clear. These are voluntary interviews, and anyone who doesn't want to answer
questions doesn't have to." Wilgoren, supra note 22.
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as soon as possible-by December 4.

Boyd defended the interviews against criticism that the
Justice Department was engaged in a dragnet interrogation
process by explaining how the interviews were designed to
assist the government's September 11 investigation: "You start
out by casting your net broadly-overly broadlya-and we narrow down to a group that is helpful."26 In an attempt to make
the interviews as comfortable as possible, Collins asserted that
persons receiving the Justice Department's letter were free to
bring an interpreter or lawyer and could choose the location of
the interview.27 Boyd conceded that some of the men targeted
for interviews may have violated immigration laws, but he
nonetheless claimed that this remained consistent with the
Attorney General's earlier statement that these men were not
criminal suspects.'
Boyd and Collins's news conference was held a few days
after an internal memorandum from the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) was leaked to the press, which suggested that the interviews were a potential vehicle to identify
immigration violators and persons connected with the Septem-

" Jim Schaefer, U.S. Softens Tactics in
Terror Questioning, DETROIT FREE
PRESS, Nov. 27, 2001, at 1A; see also Allan Lengel, Arab Men in Detroit to Be
Asked to See U.S. Attorney, WASH. POST, Nov. 27, 2001, at AS.
26 Micheline Maynard, U.S. Officials Explain Interview Plans at a Community
Forum, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2001, at B7.
27 Lengel, supra note 25.
25 David Shepardson, Community Airs Hate Crime Fears at Forum, DETROIT

NEWS, Nov. 21, 2001, at 3A. Boyd maintained that the interviews were strictly
"voluntary." Id. ("Voluntary means voluntary. If someone doesn't want to be interviewed and says no, that's it."). However, some local police officials' comments
may have signaled to the men on the list that the interviews were-for all intents and purposes-mandatory. For example, William Dwyer, the president of the
Michigan Association of Chiefs of Police, suggested that Arab men could not simply fail to respond to the letter and expect to be off the hook. See Lengel, supra
note 25 (noting Dwyer's emphasis on "follow-up" for people who did not interview
with authorities since "we're at war"). In Florida, the president of the International Association of Chiefs of Police was more blunt about how "voluntary" the
interviews were: "Agreeing with federal authorities that the interviews are voluntary, [one police chief] said it's in the [alien's] best interest to cooperate. If they
say I'm not telling you, then you know what, you're going back home." Megan
O'Matz & Jeff Shields, Federal Queries Worry Muslims, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), Nov. 29, 2001, at 1A.
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ber 11 attacks. 9 The memo, written by an INS official, stated
that immigration violators would be detained and held without
bond. 0 According to the memo, requests by FBI agents "to
detain immigration violators under 'no bond' should be honored
and [would] be handled in the same manner as all prior cases
with a direct nexus to the Sept. 11 investigation."3 1 A spokeswoman for the INS acknowledged the existence of the memo
but claimed that Attorney General Ashcroft's original policy remained intact: "Our primary purpose here is not identifying
immigration law violations ... but at the same time, it is our
job to uphold the law. If we come across violators, we will report them."3 2
Arab-American groups, advocates for immigrants and even
a few police chiefs protested that the Attorney General's order
amounted to racial profiling. Some police officials who were
asked to conduct the interviews publicly complained that the
interviews violated their policies opposing racial profiling.33
Some local police officials feared that the Justice Department's
interrogations might violate civil liberties and create a false
perception that the police were treating the interviewees as
criminals,34 while other police officials noted that the Justice
Department had not explained how they had compiled the list
of five thousand men. 5 Moreover, some police officials stated
that they were confused about how to proceed with the interviews." One deputy police chief in a Michigan suburb said,

"

Memo Adds to Suspicions of Immigrants on Interviews, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29,

2001, at B6.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Id.
3S See, e.g., Jodi Wilgoren, University of Michigan Won't Cooperate in Federal

Canvass, N.Y. TIMS, Dec. 1, 2001, at B6 (citing police departments that refused
to cooperate or objected to the Justice Department's program).
" See Fox Butterfield, Police Are Split on Questioning of Mideast Men, N.Y.

TIMES, Nov. 22, 2001, at Al (quoting Detroit Police Chief Charles Wilson saying
that "he did not want his officers to 'go out and treat people like criminals or
even go out and find these people').
Id.
36 Jodi Wilgoren, Michigan Officers Fear Pressure of US. Plan, N.Y. TIMES,
"

Nov. 17, 2001, at B1 (quoting Robert Stevenson, a deputy police chief in Livonia,
Michigan).
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"We don't even know what we'd be looking for [when conducting the interviews.]"37
After the controversy surrounding the interrogations faded
from the forefront of the national news media, a few thoughtful
legal commentators decided that the interviews did not raise
the worst problems associated with racial or ethnic profiling.
Professor Eric Muller, an expert on the internment of Japanese-American citizens in the aftermath of the Pearl Harbor
attack, has concluded that the Justice Department's "program
of interrogation, if it was ethnic profiling at all, was ethnic
profiling with a decidedly light touch." 8 Muller acknowledges
the difficulty in accepting the government's initial claim that
the interrogation program was ethnically neutral.3 9 "But on
closer examination," Muller finds that "the government's defense of its program is plausible."4 ° Muller contrasts the mildness of the Justice Department's interviews with the coercive
and oppressive nature of the federal government's policies toward Japanese aliens and Japanese-American citizens sixty
years ago.41

37

Id.
" Eric L. Muller, 12/7 and 9/11: War, Liberties, and the Lessons of History,
104 W. VA. L. REv. 571, 577 (2002).
"" See id. at 575. Muller notes:
We might roll our eyes when our government today defends its interrogation program as ethnicity-neutral. After all, while the five thousand young
men may not have been selected because they are Arab, we do know that
they were selected because they arrived recently from countries where al
Qaeda operates, and that certainly sounds like a pretext for anti-Arab
discrimination.
Id.

0 Id. at 575-76. In reaching this conclusion, Muller notes that the number of
Arab aliens selected for interrogation, five thousand, was a small percentage-just
under three percent--of the total number of Arab aliens living in the United
States, which was approximately 170,000. "[A] number so small [seems] to suggest
that the government did in fact target people for questioning on the basis of
criteria other than the raw fact of their origin in an Arab country." Id. at 576.
Muller also relies on the fact that "despite dire predictions that the supposedly
information-gathering interviews would be mere pretext for coercive criminal interrogations, this turned out not to be so." Id.
" See id. at 591 (noting that the Bush Administration has not utilized extreme measures against aliens of Arab ancestry or Muslim faith but has "proceeded from a premise of moderation").
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Professors Samuel Gross and Debra Livingston are undecided as to whether the interrogations constituted ethnic profiling.42 Gross and Livingston contend that "even assuming that
ethnicity was a central factor in the selection of subjects," it remains ambiguous whether this amounts to ethnic profiling. 3
According to Gross and Livingston, ethnic profiling does not
occur if government officers "focus their attention on people of
a given ethnicity because the police have information that the
specific crime they are investigating was committed by someone of that ethnic group." 4 According to their analysis, the
interrogations did not amount to ethnic profiling "if the sole
purpose for this interview program was to determine whether
any of the thousands to be interviewed was involved in this
conspiracy, or had information that might lead to those who
were." 45 Gross and Livingston concede, however, that
the Justice Department's program would involve ethnic profiling if it was undertaken even in part based upon a general
belief that Middle Eastern men are more likely to commit acts
of terrorism than people of other ethnic groups-if it was
based upon a global assumption about the criminal propensities of people of Middle Eastern descent."

42

Gross & Livingston, supra note 2. Gross and Livingston attempt to answer

the question of whether the interviews constitute racial or ethnic profiling by
considering five factors, see id. at 1418-30, which they insist are "often inextricably intertwined." Id. at 1418.
43 Id. at 1420.
" Id. Gross and Livingston later state that:
The Justice Department's interview program may not be expressly aimed
at [Middle Eastern Muslim men], but it has this effect. It is explicitly
aimed at individuals from Middle Eastern countries and other countries
with an al Qaeda presence-and for good reason. Although other groups
and individuals have committed terrorist acts in the United States, before
September 11 and probably after, it is very likely true that al Qaeda, an
organization that consists entirely of Muslim men, primarily from the
Middle East, poses the greatest immediate threat of mass terrorist killings.
Id. at 1422-23.
Id. at 1421.
" Id. Gross and Livingston acknowledge that "it is probably impossible" to
draw the type of distinction they propose in a case like the September 11 investigation, which involves a "far-flung conspiracy." Id.
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In sum, Professors Gross and Livingston find it impossible to
determine whether the Justice Department's interrogations
ethnic profiling: "The answer turns out to be a
constitute
47
draw."
Although reasonable minds might differ with Attorney
General Ashcroft's assertion that the Justice Department compiled the list in an ethnically-neutral manner, there is no debate regarding one key aspect of the list. There was no evidence revealed to the public that the men targeted for interrogations had any connection with terrorism or the events of
September 11. According to one police chief who was asked to
conduct the interviews, neither the Justice Department nor the
FBI provided any specific details on why the men were targeted for interrogation." The Justice Department lacked even a
reasonable suspicion to believe that any of the men selected for
interrogation had committed a crime or had a connection with
known terrorists or the September 11 attacks."9 The bottom
line is that the Justice Department was engaged in a fishing
expedition to find individuals who might know something about
the horrific events of September 11.
In my view, the timing and criteria used to target the men
for interrogation and the methods employed by the federal

41 Id. at 1436. Gross and Livingston assert that the interview process is:

ethnic profiling to the extent that the FBI is operating on a general assumption that Middle Eastern men are more likely than others to commit
acts of terror; it is not to the extent that the agents are pursuing casespecific information about the September 11 attacks, albeit in a dragnet
fashion. In practice, we cannot separate or distinguish between these two
conditions.
Id.

,a See Fox Butterfield, A Police Force Rebuffs F.B.I. on Querying Mideast Men,
N.Y. TIMgs, Nov. 21, 2001, at B7 (describing the complaint of the acting Police
Chief of Portland, Oregon, that the FBI list "contained 'no specifics' about what
crimes the 5,000 men might be involved with"); see also Butterfield, supra note
34 (noting concern of the executive director of the Police Executive Research Forum that local police departments that have been asked to conduct interviews
were not told "why certain names were put on the list. All that has been said is
that the men have legally traveled to the United States in the past two years
from nations with suspected terrorist links.").
, Butterfield, supra note 34.

2003]

FOURTH AMENDMENT IN A TIME OF TERROR

487

government indicate that the Justice Department's list is a
clear example of ethnic profiling. Justice Department officials
were responding to a national emergency while also trying to
prevent future attacks. The nineteen terrorists who conducted
the attacks on September 11 came from Middle Eastern countries. If the government was interested in gathering information about future terrorism, common sense indicates that the
government should question individuals with similar backgrounds. As the special agent in charge of the Detroit FBI
office conceded, this might be a form of profiling, but the government had little choice: "Terrorists aren't born. Terrorists
have to recruit members. It doesn't make much sense to go to
people in northern Canada and talk to them about it." °
While the timing and release of the list appears logical-the nation had been recently attacked by a terrorist network devoted to the destruction of Americans-the list raised
the fears of those selected for interrogation. Arabs and Muslims
living in this country understood the need for an investigation,
but many critics of the Justice Department's interrogations
viewed the list as a government investigation focused on ethnicity rather than on suspicious conduct.5 1 As the executive

'* Jim Schaefer, 840 Face Anti-Terror Net Locally: Men with Mideast Ties to

be Questioned, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Nov. 15, 2001, at 1A (quoting special agent
John Bell as "acknowledg[ing] that the interviews could be seen as profiling-all
the men are Middle Eastern, all ages 18 to 33-but said the government has
little choice. The effort aims to find anyone who may have had contact with bin
Laden's al-Qaeda organization."); see also COLE, supra note 4, at 53 (noting that,
[iun the immediate aftermath of the September 11 attacks, a reasonable argument could be made that the use of ethnic and immigrant identity as factors in
the investigation of those attacks did not constitute ethnic profiling"). Cf. Steve
Brill, The FBI Gets Religion, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 28, 2002, at 32. Brill argued that
law enforcement officers,
like reporters, always have to question lots of people in hopes of finding
someone who might know something or someone--or who might later hear
about someone who knows someone. The only thing that has to be justified is the decision to target people coming from particular countries,
and that kind of 'profiling' becomes a lot less controversial once the mindset-and the articulated goal-has to do with getting information, not

grilling suspects.
Id.

&I See Wilgoren, supra note 22 (noting that Arabs and Muslims living in the
United States felt "the government is sanctioning suspicion based on background,
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director of the American Arab Chamber of Commerce asserted,
"[wle've gone from an investigation into the attacks committed
[on] Sept. 11 to investigating an entire race, and that's dangerous."52 Many students from Middle Eastern countries, for example, were fully aware, like everyone else, that the September
11 attackers allegedly "plotted the attacks in Germany and
England, and suspected ringleader Mohamed Atta traveled to
Spain and the Czech Republic.""3 Despite these connections to
certain European nations, the Justice Department did not announce that foreign students from European countries were
targeted for interviews. The director of international education
at the University of Colorado summarized the views of many
Middle Eastern students when he noted, "[tihe students are not
sure what the purpose of the questions are [sic] . . . [blut they

know that the government isn't interviewing any students from
Germany. " '
Moreover, the publicly announced criteria used to compile
the list "certainly sounds like a pretext for anti-Arab discrimination."55 While Bush Administration officials insisted that
the list was ethnically-neutral, the distinction drawn by these
officials-that a classification based on nationality is different
from a classification based on ancestry or ethnicity-is often
ambiguous. As Professor Mariano-Florentino Cuellar recently
noted:
Race and national origin often correlate highly, can be observed in tandem, and are treated similarly in constitutional

not behavior").

52 Geralda Miller, Federal Plan to Interview Arab Men Called 'Dangerous,"

GRAND RAPID PRESS, Nov. 21, 2001, at D6 (quoting Nasser Beydoun, executive
director of the Arab Chamber of Commerce).
"' Karen Guilo, Investigators Questioning 5,000 Foreigners in U.S., SEATTLE
TIMES, Nov. 14, 2001, at A5.
"' Jacques Steinberg, A Nation Challenged: The Students, U.S. Has Covered
200 Campuses to Check Up on Mideast Students, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2001, at
Al (quoting Larry Bell, Director of International Education of University of Colorado); see also COLE, supra note 4, at 49 (noting persons targeted for questioning
were from countries "where support for Al Qaeda was believed to exist, but apparently did not include Great Britain, France, Spain, or Germany, even though
Al Qaeda suspects from each of these countries have been captured").
" Muller, supra note 38, at 575.
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adjudication. Both kinds of profiling involve a probability
judgment that a particular person is worth the attention of
law enforcement, whether at the investigative, administrative
enforcement, or prosecution stage.5"
Justice Brennan made a similar observation in Saint Francis
College v. Al-Khazraji," writing that "the line between discrimination based on 'ancestry or ethnic characteristics,' and
discrimination based on 'place or nation of... origin,' is not a
bright one."5" Classifications based on ethnicity and nationality can be two sides of the same coin. As Justice Brennan
recognized, a person can be born into a nation whose "primary
stock is one's own ethnic group."5 9
Finally, when one combines the razor-thin distinction proffered by the Justice Department with the dragnet qualities of
the interrogations, it becomes difficult to avoid the suspicion
that the Department is trying to have it both ways. The Department vehemently denies that the list constitutes ethnic
profiling, but simultaneously insists on the authority to conduct
suspicionless interrogations of men from Middle Eastern countries that are dominated by persons of Arab ancestry. As Professor David Cole characterized the Department's list, "[t]his is
as close as you get to ethnic profiling without literally relying
on ethnicity.' ° While Department officials and others insist
" Mariano-Florentino Cuellar, Choosing Anti-Terror Targets by National Origin
and Race, 6 HARv. LATINO L. REv. 9, 16 (2003).
481 U.S. 604 (1987).
Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. at 612 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
59 Id. (conceding that ancestry
and nation original are not always the same;
'[o]ften, however, the two are identical as a factual matter: one was born in the
nation whose primary stock is one's own ethnic group").
" Gullo, supra note 53; see also Lisa Biank Fasig, ACLU Urges Police: Refuse
to Help U.S. Government Detain Immigrants, PROVIDENCE JOURNAL-BULLETIN, Dec.
3, 2001, at B3 (quoting executive director of Rhode Island ACLU, describing list
as, "nothing but thinly disguised racial profiling"). In a subsequent detailed discussion of the topic, Professor Cole concludes that the government's list of Arab
and Muslim men selected for interviews and other policies that target only Arabs
and Muslim aliens "look[s] like what a clever young lawyer would come up with
if directed by his superiors to 'develop a program for targeting Arabs and Muslims but make sure we can deny that it is ethnic profiling." COLE, supra note 4,
at 52. According to Cole:
[A]s the September 11 investigation turned into a more general war on
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that the list is ethnic-neutral, the persuasiveness of this claim
may depend on whether you are one of the men targeted on the
government's list. Under the circumstances, the Justice
Department's distinction between ethnicity and national origin
is distinctly reminiscent of the claim that discrimination on the
basis of pregnancy is not gender discrimination," and discrimination on the basis of Spanish language ability is not ethnic
discrimination.62 The persuasiveness of those assertions may
also turn on whether you are a woman or bilingual.'
A few years ago, the traffic enforcement practices of the
New Jersey State Police made national headlines due to allegations of racial profiling by individual troopers. Imagine if the
commander of the State Police defended his troopers with the
following reply:
We are not engaged in racial profiling of black drivers per se.
Troopers do not target or stop black female drivers, nor do
troopers target or stop older black drivers, whether male or
female. Troopers only target young, male African-Americans,
terrorism of indefinite (and potentially infiite) duration, encompassing
not a specific locality but the whole nation and indeed the entire world,
and not a specific group but all "terrorists of global reach," the Justice
Department's reliance on Arab and Muslim identity has come to look
more and more like the Army's use of Japanese ancestry as a proxy for
suspicion during World War II.
Id. at 54.
61 See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 494-95 (1974) (holding that a state's
insurance program that excluded disability protection for normal pregnancy and
childbirth was not invidious discrimination against women under the Equal Protection Clause). Cf. Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 264
(1993) (ruling that animus towards abortion did not constitute class-based animus
towards women under federal civil rights statute).
' See Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 360-62 (1991) (holding that
prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to exclude potential jurors who were
bilingual is not forbidden ethnic discrimination under Equal Protection Clause).
63 Justice Department officials might have been more credible if they had
acknowledged that the men were included on the list because of their ethnicity,
and that a national emergency justified the ethnic classification. See Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214, 219-20 (1944) (compelling governmental interest
justified racial classification). Cf. William Safire, Seizing Dictatorial Power, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 15, 2001, at A31 ("To meet a terrorist emergency, of course some
rules should be stretched and new laws passed. An ethnic dragnet rounding up
visa-skippers or questioning foreign students, if short-term, is borderline tolerable.").
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who drive new model vehicles or rental cars, which is only a
small sub-set of all the black drivers who travel on the Turnpike.
I suspect that many would quickly dismiss this explanation of
why New Jersey State troopers disproportionately stop young,
black drivers as a sham. Yet Justice Department officials and
others appear to offer a markedly similar analysis by insisting
that targeting five thousand young aliens from Arab countries
does not amount to ethnic profiling. The federal government
claims that targeting these men from predominately Arab countries is not the equivalent of targeting Arabs per se. Yet if this
explanation is sufficient to repel a charge of ethnic profiling,
then the reply of my hypothetical commander of the New Jersey State Police is an equally plausible defense to charges of
racial profiling.
Consider the reaction of police officials in a small, rural
and predominately white town in upstate New York following
the attack of a seventy-seven-year-old white woman. The woman said, "her attacker was a black man wielding a 'stilletostyle' knife whose arms and hands she cut fending them off."'
Police officials then compiled a list of the black and Hispanic
male students registered at the State University of New York
College at Oneonta.6 5 Police and campus police officers then
used the list "to track down black and Hispanic students in
their dormitories, at their jobs and in the shower. From each,
the police demanded to know his whereabouts when the attack
occurred; each had to show his arms and hands."" When no
suspects were immediately apprehended, the police then
"conducted a 'sweep' of Oneonta, stopping and questioning nonwhite persons on the streets and inspecting their hands for
cuts." 7 Over two hundred individuals were questioned during

" Diana Jean Schemo, College Town in Uproar Over "Black List" Search, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 27, 1992, at 33; see also Brown v. City of Oneonta, 221 F.3d 329,
334 (2d Cir. 2000).
65 Brown, 221 F.3d at 334.
66

Id.

67

id.
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a period of several days.6"
A federal appeals court subsequently concluded that the
police action in Oneonta did not amount to a racial classification under the Equal Protection Clause.6 9 Compiling a list of
black and Hispanic students and subjecting those individuals to
interrogation (and possibly detention) was not "racial profiling"
per se because police focused on "not only race, but also gender
and age, as well as the possibility of a cut on the hand."7M Although the federal judiciary viewed the police practices in
Oneonta as race-neutral, others disagreed with that assertion.71 While my objective is not to re-litigate the issue in
Brown v. City of Oneonta, I mention the Oneonta "list" because,
similar to the Justice Department "list," deciding whether governmental action constitutes racial or ethnic profiling is sometimes a judgment call.72

Id.
Id. at 337.
70 Id.
"' See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 1, at 181 ("Presumably the police [in
Oneonta] did not classify by age or gender either, because they did consider race.
In the magic land of Oneonta, police officers who classify on more than one basis
classify on none. One plus one equals zero."); Ramirez, et al., supra note 1, at
1219 (noting that the ruling "illustrates the folly of attempting to stop or question
every person who fits a general description such as 'young black male' without
relying on any more specific and readily identifiable characteristics. To do so allows police to focus almost exclusively on the racial element of the victim's
description."); Bob Herbert, In America; Breathing While Black, N.Y. TImEs, Nov.
4, 1999, at A29 (asserting that the police response in Oneonta "went far beyond
the problem of driving while black. People were being stopped in Oneonta for
breathing while black."). Cf R. Richard Banks, Race-Based Suspect Selection and
Colorblind Equal Protection Doctrine and Discourse, 48 UCLA L. REv. 1075 (2001)
(criticizing the widely accepted distinction between racial profiling, which is generally condemned, and the use of a race-based perpetrator description, which is
generally accepted as a permissible use of race by law enforcement officials).
72 Defining ethnic or racial profiling in this context is no easy task. Although
I do not offer a bright line rule defining ethnic profiling, I do share the views expressed in a report issued by the New Jersey Attorney General's Office on racial
profiling in the context of traffic enforcement. The New Jersey Attorney General
defined racial profiling broadly "to encompass any action taken by a state trooper
during a traffic stop that is based upon racial or ethnic stereotypes and that has
the effect of treating minority motorists differently than non-minority motorists."
Verniero & Zoubek, supra note 3, at 47. In other situations, determining whether
a racial classification exists is easy. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214, 216-20 (1944).
68
69
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In my view, the distinction proffered by the Justice Department--classifying Arab aliens based on nationality versus classifying Arabs aliens based on ancestry or ethnicity-is unpersuasive given the context. The government was responding to a
national emergency and knew that all of the September 11
attackers came from a Middle Eastern nation. The
government's objective was to locate others who might have
aided the September 11 attacks or knew of future attacks. The
Justice Department then proceeded to compile a list of young
men from mostly Middle Eastern and Muslim nations, and
subsequently targeted those men for "voluntary" interviews
with federal Anti-Terrorism Task Force officers. Although conceding that none of the men on its list were criminal suspects,
and lacking any reasonable suspicion that the men were connected specifically with the September 11 attacks or terrorist
organizations, the government claimed that these men might
have helpful information for law enforcement's September 11
investigation. In light of these circumstances, the government's
investigative procedure following September 11 amounted to an
ethnic-based fishing expedition.73
B. Were The Interviews "Seizures"Under
The Fourth Amendment?
Whether the Justice Department's list amounts to ethnic or
racial profiling is immaterial for determining the permissibility
of the interviews under the Fourth Amendment. As previously
noted, an officer's subjective intent or racial bias is irrelevant
to ordinary police procedures according to Whren. The Fourth
Amendment issue in Whren arose from a traffic stop, which
obviously constitutes a seizure. The Department, of course,
insists that the interviews were not "seizures" under the
Fourth Amendment because they were consensual. To determine the validity of this assertion, it is inconsequential wheth-

n Defending the interview process, the Justice Department's top civil rights
official, Ralph Boyd, Jr., offered a polite description of the "dragnet" procedure
employed by the Department: "You start out by casting your net broadly--overly
broadly-and we narrow down to a group that is helpful." Maynard, supra note
26.
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er the judiciary believes that the list itself or the motivations
behind the compilation of the list constituted racial or ethnic
profiling. While it may seem illogical to the non-lawyer, the
question of whether the interviews trigger Fourth Amendment
protection is unrelated to determining if the government's decision to conduct the interviews was motivated by ethnic concerns.
The Justice Department maintained that the interrogation
of young aliens did not implicate the Fourth Amendment because the interviews were voluntary. On the other hand, opponents of the government's interview procedure contend that
many of the men targeted for questioning felt they were in no
position to resist the government's request. Someone unfamiliar
with nuances of the Supreme Court's search and seizure doctrine might find the government's claim hard to swallow. The
Department's position, however, is supported by the Court's
precedent.74 The Court has stated that police questioning typically does not trigger constitutional scrutiny.75 A seizure occurs under the Fourth Amendment only when a person no
longer feels free to leave a police-citizen encounter or does not
feel free to avoid or terminate police contact.76 Although police
officials are permitted to question a person without cause or
suspicion of criminality, according to the law, that person is
equally free to ignore the police inquiry.7 7 Moreover, a person's
decision to leave the scene of a police encounter or refusal to
cooperate with the police does not provide legal cause for police
detention of the individual.7"
The Court's most recent decisions clarify the tactics that
law enforcement officials may use to question individuals without raising constitutional concerns. United States v. Drayton7 9

addressed the constitutionality of a "bus sweep" conducted by
Tallahassee, Florida police officers. 0 Ten years earlier, in
7' See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991).
7' Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434; Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497 (1983) (plurality opinion).
76 Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434.
7 Id. at 435-36
"' See Royer, 460 U.S. at 497-98.
79 536 U.S. 194 (2002).
o Drayton, 536 U.S. at 203-04. During a bus sweep, police officers systemati-
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Florida v. Bostick, the Court ruled that bus sweeps were not a
separate category of police-citizen encounters under the Fourth
Amendment."1 Bostick held that a seizure does not occur simply because a police confrontation unfolds inside the cramped
confines of a bus. 2 Bostick explained that bus sweeps should
be judged by the same standard applicable to other police-citizen encounters: considering "all the circumstances surrounding
the encounter," would a reasonable person feel free to terminate or avoid the encounter?83
The issue in Drayton concerned "whether officers must
advise bus passengers during these encounters of their right
not to cooperate."8 Drayton involved the following facts: during a stop in Tallahassee, three police officers boarded a Greyhound bus en route from Fort Lauderdale, Florida to Detroit,
Michigan. 5 After the driver left the bus, one officer sat on the
driver's seat and watched the rear of the bus. 6 The other two
officers, Lang and Blackburn, proceeded to the rear of the bus
and began questioning passengers. 7 Lang approached
Drayton and Brown, who were seated next to each other with
Drayton sitting in the aisle seat. Lang identified himself as a
police officer, put his face within twelve to eighteen inches of
Drayton's face and said in a quiet tone: "I'm Investigator Lang
with the Tallahassee Police Department. We're conducting bus
interdiction [sic], attempting to deter drugs and illegal weapons
being transported on the bus. Do you have any bags on the
bus?"8 Drayton and Brown pointed to a bag in the luggage
rack, and Lang received their permission to search the bag. s
After failing to find incriminating evidence in the bag, Lang
asked if either man was carrying weapons or drugs on their
cally or randomly question passengers about their itinerary and seek consent to
search the passenger's person or luggage.
:I Bostick, 501 U.S. at 439-40.
82 Id. at 439.
" Id.
Drayton, 536 U.S. at 197.
Ild.
8a Id.
'7 Id. at 197-98.
8' Id.

89 Id.

at 198.
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persons." Lang first requested and received permission to
search Brown. Lang frisked Brown and discovered hard objects
near Brown's thighs that he suspected were packages of
drugs.91 Brown was subsequently arrested and removed from
the bus. 92 Lang then asked and obtained Drayton's permission
to search his person.93 A patdown of Drayton's thighs revealed
similar hard objects.' Drayton was arrested and a later
search of the men disclosed packages of powder cocaine taped
between several pairs of boxer shorts. 95
Addressing the constitutional validity of the officers' encounter, the Court decided whether Drayton and Brown voluntarily consented to the search and if a seizure had occurred
under the Fourth Amendment.9 With regard to the issue of
seizure, the Court first criticized the Eleventh Circuit for
adopting "what [was] in effect a per se rule that evidence obtained during suspicionless drug interdiction efforts aboard
buses must be suppressed unless the officers have advised
passengers of their right not to cooperate and to refuse consent
to a search."97 Speaking for the majority, Justice Kennedy
reiterated the Court's previous view that per se rules are inappropriate for determining if a police-citizen encounter constituted a seizure. 9 Applying the traditional "totality" test, Justice
Kennedy found that a seizure had not occurred when the officers "boarded the bus and began questioning passengers.'
According to Justice Kennedy, the facts reflected an encounter
that was cooperative and devoid of coercion or confronta-

'* Id. Apparently Officer Lang's suspicions were aroused because Drayton and
Brown "were wearing heavy jackets and baggy pants despite the warm weather.
In Lang's experience drug traffickers often use baggy clothing to conceal weapons

or narcotics." Id. at 199.
Id.
Id.
9 Id.
'1

94

Id.

id.
" Id.

at 200 (explaining that Drayton and Brown "were not seized and their

consent to search was voluntary").
Id. at 202.
'

Id. at 201.
Id. at 203.
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tion.'" "There was no application of force, no intimidating
movement, no overwhelming show of force, no brandishing of
weapons, no blocking of exits, no threat, no command, not even
an authoritative tone of voice." °1
To bolster his conclusion, Justice Kennedy asserted, without proof or empirical support, that the surroundings of the bus
may have enhanced a person's confidence during a police encounter: "[Blecause many fellow passengers are present to
witness officers' conduct, a reasonable person may feel even
more secure in his or her decision not to cooperate with police
on a bus than in other circumstances."" 2 Justice Kennedy also asserted-again without empirical support-that "bus passengers answer officers' questions and otherwise cooperate not
because of coercion but because the passengers know that their
participation enhances their own safety and the safety of those
around them."0 3
In addressing whether Drayton and Brown voluntarily
consented to the search, Justice Kennedy initially noted that,
"where the question of voluntariness pervades both the search
and seizure inquiries, the respective analyses turn on very
similar facts.""°4 Once the Court coupled the seizure and con-

10 Id.
101

102

Id.
Id.

at 203-04.
at 204.

10 Id.
at 205. Justice Kennedy was unimpressed with the defendants' claims
that Officer Lang's displaying of his badge, the position of the officer who sat in
the driver's seat and Lang's testimony that very few passengers refuse to cooperate with his requests, supported their argument that a reasonable person would
not feel free to resist Lang's inquiries. Id. at 204-05.
104 Id.
at 206. Justice Kennedy's analysis wrongly conflates the issues of "consent" and "seizure.' In Drayton, Justice Kennedy "implicitly adopted the same
'free to refuse/terminate' test for deciding voluntariness of consent to search that
has been used since Bostick for deciding the seizure question." Janice Nadler, No
Need to Shout: Bus Sweeps and the Psychology of Coercion, 2002 SUP. CT. REV.
153, 162. This is not the first time the Court has confused the issues of consent
and seizure-the Bostick Court made a similar error. See 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE,
SEARCH & SEiZURE § 9.3(c), at 122 (3d ed. 1996) (noting that the Bostick Court
remanded the issue to Florida courts to determine whether Bostick had consented
to search of his luggage). Despite Justice Souter's observation that the issues of
consent and seizure involve considering different criteria, Drayton, 536 U.S. at
208 n.1 (Souter, J., dissenting), Justice Kennedy refused to alter his assertion
that "where the question of voluntariness pervades both the search and seizure
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sent analyses, it became evident that the Court would ultimately hold that Drayton and Brown voluntarily consented to
the search of their luggage and persons. The absence of police
notification that the men had a constitutional right to refuse
consent was inconsequential. "Although Officer Lang did not
inform respondents of their right to refuse the search, he did
request permission to search, and the totality of the circumstances indicates that their consent was voluntary, so the
searches were reasonable."105
Within one year of Drayton, the Court decided Kaupp v.
Texas,"°6 a unanimous per curiam ruling. Kaupp addressed
whether seventeen-year-old Robert Kaupp had been seized
when several police officers entered his home at approximately
3 a.m., awoke a sleeping Kaupp after his father allowed the
officers into the home and told Kaupp "we need to go and
talk."'0 7 Kaupp replied, "'Okay,'" and was then handcuffed
inquiries, the respective analyses turn on very similar facts." Id. at 206. Justice
Kennedy's opinion may be signaling a change in the law. In United States v.
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980), a majority of the Court adopted the "totality of
the circumstances" standard announced in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S.
218 (1973), for determining the voluntariness of a person's consent under the
Fourth Amendment. Under Schneckloth, voluntariness for Fourth Amendment
purposes considers "the characteristics of the accused," 412 U.S. at 226, "the nature of a person's subjective understanding" of the police confrontation, id. at 230,
as well as all the objective facts surrounding the police-citizen encounter, id. at
233. In Mendenhall, a majority of the Court agreed that Mendenhall's race, gender and educational background were "not irrelevant" to the issue of whether
Mendenhall had consented to accompany two white male federal Drug Enforcement Administration agents to an interrogation room. 446 U.S. at 558. Perhaps,
Justice Kennedy's opinion in Drayton was meant to signal that when deciding
consent questions, judges should no longer focus on the subjective considerations
and perceptions of the police target but instead focus on the hypothetical "reasonable" individual.
'- Drayton, 536 U.S. at 207. After this statement, Justice Kennedy added a
curious paragraph:
In a society based on law, the concept of agreement and consent should
be given a weight and dignity of its own. Police officers act in full accord
with the law when they ask citizens for consent. It reinforces the rule of
law for the citizen to advise the police of his or her wishes and for the
police to act in reliance on that understanding. When this exchange takes
place, it dispels inferences of coercion.
Id.
Jos123 S. Ct. 1843 (2003) (per curiam).
'07 Kaupp, 123 St. Ct. at 1845.
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and escorted from his home "shoeless and dressed only in boxer
shorts and a T-shirt" to a patrol car.' °8 The police drove
Kaupp to the location where the victim's body had been recovered, and later to the police station."° At the station, Kaupp
was taken to an interrogation room, given his Miranda
warnings and eventually confessed to his involvement in the
murder of his half-sister. 10
The Supreme Court quickly and easily reversed the Texas
Court of Appeals conclusion that Kaupp had not been seized
until after his confession. The Court explained that the facts
"show ] beyond cavil" that Kaupp had been seized and arrested
when the police escorted him from his home,"' and there was
no basis for concluding that Kaupp had voluntarily consented
to leave his home with police.
Kaupp's "Okay" in response to [Detective] Pinkins's statement
is no showing of consent under the circumstances. Pinkins
offered Kaupp no choice, and a group of police officers rousing
an adolescent out of bed in the middle of the night with the
words "we need to go and talk" presents no option but "to go."
There is no reason to think Kaupp's answer was anything
more than "a mere submission to a claim of lawful authority.,,l2

The nature of Kaupp's trip to the police station provided
further evidence that police had seized Kaupp prior to his con-

" Id. The police suspected that Kaupp had been involved in the murder of
his half-sister. Id. at 1844.
Id. at 1845.
110 Id.

. The Court concluded that under a "straightforward application" of the reasonable person test, Kaupp had been seized. Id. at 1846.
A 17-year-old boy was awakened in his bedroom at three in the morning
by at least three police officers, one of whom stated 'we need to go and
talk.' He was taken out in handcuffs, without shoes, dressed only in his
underwear in January, placed in a patrol car, driven to the scene of a
crime and then to the sheriffs offices, where he was taken into an interrogation room and questioned.
Id. The Court asserted that ItIhis evidence points to arrest even more starkly
than the facts in Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 212 (1979)." Id.
"1 Id. at 1847 (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491,
496 (1983) (plurality
opinion)).
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fession. In the Court's view, "removal from one's house in handcuffs on a January night with nothing on but underwear for a
trip to a crime scene on the way to an interview room at law
enforcement headquarters" had all the earmarks of an arrest.113 Finally, the sheriffs department's practice of
"'routinely'" transporting people in this manner for safety purposes, and Kaupp's failure to protest the police process, did not
undermine the Court's judgment that a seizure had occurred.1 14
To the untrained eye, Drayton and Kaupp may appear to
be polar opposites on a wide spectrum of police-citizen encounters: Drayton illustrates one end of the spectrum that allows
police questioning without triggering constitutional safeguards;
Kaupp depicts the other end representing those police practices
that are not considered consensual encounters. For the vast
middle ground between the two ends, police-citizen encounters
are judged on a case-by-case basis according to a reasonable
person standard. This interpretation of Kaupp and Drayton is
erroneous. Drayton and Kaupp are not polar opposites but
instead illustrate different legal principles. A police-citizen
encounter is not considered a seizure, regardless of how coercive the encounter might be from an individual's perspective,
unless the police engage in patently abusive and intimidating
behavior.1 5 When properly understood, Drayton represents
113 Id.

.. Id. The Court explained that police "motivation of self-protection does not
speak to how their actions would reasonably be understood" and "failure to struggle with a cohort of deputy sheriffs is not a waiver of Fourth Amendment protection, which does not require the perversity of resisting arrest or assaulting a

police officer." Id.
" See Nadler, supra note 104, at 163 (noting Drayton Court's "unstated concern-that the police be permitted to engage in suspicionless seizures and
consentless searches so long as they avoid abusive or overly coercive tactics-is
masked by its stated holding that citizens are not seized or involuntarily searched

within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment if they feel free to refuse police requests"); William J. Stuntz, Local Policing After the Terror, 111 YALE L.J. 2137,
2170 n.102 (2002) (asserting that no one considers the Court's definition of "seizure" serious "since hardly anyone feels free to walk away from a police officer
without the officer's permission. The actual (though unarticulated) definition is
more like this: One is seized when a police officer behaves with a higher level of
coercion than is ordinarily and reasonable in a brief street encounter."); see, e.g.,
Bostick, 501 U.S. at 437 (expressing doubt that a seizure had occurred during a
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the enormous discretion and power of police to accost and interrogate persons without constitutional safeguards. Kaupp, on
the other hand, illustrates the rarely invoked exception."1 6 In
sum, Drayton and Kaupp symbolize the very narrow protection
the Fourth Amendment provides against coercive police encounters.
When the constitutional validity of the Justice
Department's voluntary interviews project are measured by
standards reaffirmed in Drayton and Kaupp, it is highly unlikely that any court will find that the interrogation sessions constituted seizures under the Fourth Amendment. Evidence regarding the conduct of investigators during the interviews is
sporadic and anecdotal and comes primarily from press reports.
Newspaper stories suggest that the interviews never approached conditions that would trigger constitutional safeguards. 7 There have been no reports of the type of police
conduct that provoked the Court to reverse the judgment in
Kaupp. No examples have surfaced involving the application of
physical force, intimidating movements, overwhelming displays
of force, brandishing of weapons, blocking of exits, threats,
commands or use of authoritative tone of voice.' Media accounts generally indicate that the interrogation sessions were
consensual encounters under the Fourth Amendment. Even one
of the more outrageous incidents described by the press fell far
short of the conduct condemned in Kaupp."9
bus sweep, majority notes that "officers did not point guns at [the passenger] or
otherwise threaten him").
1. Cf. Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 815 (1985) (forcibly removing suspect
from his home or other place, transporting him to the police station and detaining him at the station for investigative purposes is sufficiently like arrest to require probable cause).
'. See Brill, supra note 50, at 33 ("According to lawyers who sat in on 220
interviews across the country and nine people who were interviewed without lawyers, the sessions were polite, even solicitous. Gone were the grillings about

prayer habits or votes cast. The agents asked the young immigrants 21 relatively
benign questions from a script."); Niraj Warikoo, Interviews of Arab Men Are
Finished, DETRoIT FREE PRESS, Feb. 7, 2002, at 1B (noting that "two months and
300-plus interviews later, Arab-American leaders say the process in Michigan
wasn't as bad as they expected").
.1.See Drayton, 536 U.S. at 204 (listing criteria that might invoke Fourth
Amendment protection).
"' Columnist Steven Brill described Ali Erikenoglu's encounter with FBI
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In light of Drayton, it is very unlikely that any judge would
find that the interviews constituted seizures. Although prevailing constitutional standards support the Justice Department's
contention that the interrogation sessions were consensual, the
soundness of that conclusion is tenuous at best. From both an
objective and subjective perspective, it is difficult to imagine
that a young Arab alien would feel free to refuse or ignore the
federal government's request for an interview.1 2 ° After the ini-

agents:
At about 10:30 on the night of Sept. 20, [2001,] Ali Erikenoglu heard
rustling in the bushes below his bedroom in the small, three-family home
he owns in Paterson, N.J. He got up, leaned out the window and saw, he
says, "four or five men with flashlights" in his backyard. The men identified themselves as the FBI and told him they needed to ask him some
questions.
Erikenoglu says that while two agents roamed the apartment (except
for the bedroom, where his wife remained sleeping) examining books,
videos, religious plaques and papers, two others made him produce his
license and passport, and his wife's passport. They spent about an hour
asking a series of questions about how often he prays, what tourist sites
he had visited, how often he had traveled abroad, "what kind of American
are you" and "what is it about your religion that allows people like these
terrorists to do what they did?"
Erikenoglu says the agents finally told him that someone from one of
the construction jobs he had worked on had called and said that he had
expressed sympathy for the terrorists after the bombing of the USS Cole.
"I told them I never said anything like that," says Erikenoglu. "I complained that this is like McCarthyism-some anonymous person calls up,
or maybe doesn't call up, but you have a Muslim name and there's the
knock on the door asking who you voted for."
On the way out, Erikenoglu claims, one agent promised: "We'll be
back to take you in cuffs if we find that one thing you told us is a lie,
or if we find that any of your phone numbers got a call to or from a terrorist."
Brill, supra note 50, at 32-33.
12 See Morning Edition: Lawyers Speak Out About Immigration Charges
Brought Against Foreigners in the US (National Public Radio, Dec. 5, 2001). Karen Pennington, a Texas lawyer who has represented individuals targeted for
interviews, stated that the "FBI has a great deal of control over these men's lives
and that they may be putting themselves at risk should they fail to cooperate."
Id. Pennington further asserted that once these men are approached, the interviews "become not voluntary but rather something that they will be compelled to
participate in." Id. Mr. Omar Mahmood, a PhD student and American citizen who
spent time studying in Yemen, agreed to meet with FBI officials with an attorney
present. Morning Edition: How Individual Rights Faring Under Law Enforcement's
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tial announcement of the Justice Department's interview procedures, press reports indicated that some Arab students experienced a great deal of anxiety. First, these students feared the
power of the federal government. One Syrian student described
his fear when he met two FBI agents on campus. The morning
before the interview, the agents had gone to his home and told
121
his mother that they wanted to ask him some questions.
The power and reputation of the FBI does not require an extended explanation, 122 and many young aliens in this country
understand that a request from a FBI agent or federal prosecutor for an interview should not be ignored."2

New Powers in the War on Terror's Domestic Front (National Public Radio, Sept.
5, 2002). Mr. Mahmood found the interviews to be "[a] little daunting at first, but
then after having gone through it, I felt that it wasn't that bad. It just felt like
two guys were trying to do their job." Id. Mahmood, however, articulated the
fears of other Arab-Americans: "It's easy to say you have nothing to hide, you
should welcome these types of investigations when your house has already been
raided, when your computer has never been confiscated, when your personal recordings have not been erased and taken away." Id. Twice in 2002, the FBI raided the home of Mahmood's father-in-law, even though he had not been charged.
ld.
121 Greg Winter, F.B.I. Visits Provoke Waves of Worry in Middle Eastern Men,
N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 16, 2001, at Bi.
12 See, e.g., DIARMuID JEFFREYS,
THE BUREAU: INSIDE THE MODERN FBI 7
(1995). The author quotes an FBI agent with twenty years of experience:
Nobody here talks much about [former FBI Director J. Edgar] Hoover
anymore, nobody even thinks about him much. But his spirit is still with
us. He's still the best director we ever had. Sure he did some dreadful
things and he made some big, big mistakes, and I for one will tell you
that that makes me ashamed. But there's this other side that is always
ignored. He built an organization that couldn't be intimidated by anyone.
To this day people think twice before they take on the FBI, and for good
reason. Let me tell you, every time I go out there on the streets I give
thanks that he did so.
Id.
See Todd Richissin, Critics Seek Limit to Terror Inquiries, BALT. SUN, Dec.
22, 2001, at 1A. After Drayton, in some settings, the legal analysis used to determine whether an alien was "seized" will be the same analysis used to determine
1

whether the alien "consented" to a police search or seizure. Drayton, 536 U.S. at
206 ("In circumstances such as these, where the question of voluntariness pervades both the search and seizure inquiries, the respective analyses turn on very
similar facts."); Nadler, supra note 104, at 162 (noting that seizure and consent
issues "have essentially merged in Bostick and Drayton"). Prior to Drayton, some
courts held that an alien's background is relevant in determining whether a seizure occurred. See, e.g., United States v. Grant, 920 F.2d 376, 382, 383 (6th Cir.
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For some Arab aliens, a stigma is directly attached to the
interviews. A law student at Washington University in St.
Louis compared the process to a round up of Arabs. "We want
to see the perpetrators brought to justice, but this sort of
sweeping investigation really carries with it the potential of
marginalizing an entire demographic" population.1 24 If members of an ethnic group feel marginalized or targeted for suspi-

1990) (explaining that "the characteristics of a particular defendant" were relevant
to the issue of whether a seizure had occurred, and concluding that "[dlue to his
ignorance of police practices in the United States and his status as an alien, [the
defendant] most likely felt compelled to answer the agents' questions and to submit to their demands"). The analysis in Grant is inconsistent with the Court's repeated instructions, prior to Drayton, that the seizure issue should be determined
from the perspective of the objective, "reasonable" person. See Bostick, 501 U.S. at
438 (seizure analysis presupposes reasonable, innocent person); Mendenhall, 446
U.S. at 554 (plurality opinion). Thus, "characteristics of a particular defendant,"
Grant, 920 F.2d at 382, would seem to be irrelevant to the seizure issue. On the
other hand, a person's status as an alien should be relevant to the question of
consent because "the characteristics of the accused" and "the nature of a person's
subjective understanding," Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226, 230, are relevant to the
issue of consent. Accordingly, courts may properly consider a person's alien status
when determining the voluntariness of consent under the Fourth Amendment. For
example, see the result in People v. Valenzuela, 33 Cal. Rptr. 802 (Ct. App. 4th
Dist. 1994), where the California Court of Appeals found the alien-defendant's
consent to a search was involuntary because, among other reasons:
An American of normal intelligence might well be presumed to know his
or her rights. The mere fact of an arrest would not necessarily affect an
American defendant's knowledge of his or her rights. A foreigner may not
be so well informed, however. To an alien, who is present in the country
on sufferance and whose privilege to be here can be revoked, a request
made by an official of the host (foreign) government may well not, in fact,
imply a right to refuse such an official request. The risk of refusal may
be too great. A person's experiences with authority figures may also reasonably indicate that compliance is mandatory. In addition, depending on
the cultural customs and mores of the alien's home country, he or she
may not appreciate the subtlety-assumed in this culture-that making a
request implies a right to refuse.
Valenzuela, 33 Cal. Rptr. at 811-12 (footnote omitted). As noted earlier, see supra
note 104, perhaps Drayton signals a change in the law regarding consent and
whether a person's subjective characteristics are relevant to the issue of consent.
There is no uncertainty, however, that Drayton reaffirmed the "reasonable person"
test for determining whether a seizure has occurred. See Drayton, 536 U.S. at 202
("The proper inquiry 'is whether a reasonable person would feel free to decline the
officers' requests or otherwise terminate the encounter.") (quoting Bostick, 501 U.S.
at 436).
" Wilgoren, supra note 22.
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cion by the most powerful law enforcement agency in the country, it is difficult to imagine these same individuals exercising
their right to say "no" when agents or prosecutors request a
"voluntary" interview. Furthermore, many lawful resident
aliens from Arab countries described another reaction--one
that many Americans might not experience upon receiving a
request for an interview from law enforcement officials. For
instance, one Arab student noted his fear that, in light of the
interview process, "Arab-Americans [would] try to hide their
origins. " "' Other Arab individuals living in the United States
worried that they might be suspected of sympathizing with
terrorists if they criticized United States policy in the Middle
East.126
In addition to these subjective fears, other practical reasons exist as to why Arab and Muslim aliens might feel compelled to acquiesce to the government's request for an interview. Some persons targeted for interviews had violated immigration restrictions or had expired visas. 2 7 The interviewees
were not given Miranda warnings, because the Justice Department adamantly maintained that the interviews were not custodial interrogations." Is it reasonable, however, for an alien
who has violated United States immigration laws to believe he
has the right to decline the government's request for an interview?129 The government's refusal to articulate the consequences of declining an interview did not inspire confidence
that such a person would remain unscathed. Although the
Department repeatedly asserted that the interviews were voluntary, it never clarified what would happen if an alien refused
to meet with police officials or if an alien exercised his Fifth
Amendment right to remain silent during questioning. Moreover, how would an individual know he even had a right to

1'2 Danny Hakim, Inquiries Put Mideast Men in Spotlight, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov.
16, 2001, at B10.
126 Mae Ghalwash, Strangers in Their Own Country; Muslim Citizens May Not

Agree with U.S. Policy but Love America, Hou. CHRON., Dec. 16, 2001, at A.
" Attorney General's Guideline Memorandum, supra note 24.
12

Id.

' In Bostick, the Court stated that the reasonable person test "presupposes
an innocent person." 501 U.S. at 438.
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remain silent if Miranda warnings were not given at the outset
of the interview session?
These factors suggest that many, if not most, Arab aliens
would have had difficulty refusing the federal government's
request for a "voluntary" interview. Several weeks following the
announcement of the interrogation sessions, President Bush
130
stated that America was "at war" with foreign terrorists.
The President also asserted that foreign "guests" in our country
should provide FBI agents with any information they might
have about terrorists. I" ' At the same time that the President
was sending this message, top Justice Department officials
acknowledged their aggressive efforts to locate terrorists in the
United States.1" 2 Faced with such public admissions by the
federal government and confronted with daily pressures of
ethnic profiling and discrimination, it is highly unlikely that
lawful resident aliens from Arab countries would have felt free
to ignore a FBI request to talk about terrorism. 3 If most
Americans feel compelled to talk to police officers during typical police encounters, why should we believe that resident
aliens from Middle Eastern and Muslim countries would not
have felt similarly compelled to talk with FBI agents about the
events of September 11?
In the final analysis, few people sincerely believe that the
Justice Department's interrogation program was truly "voluntary." Public statements by law enforcement officials were
consistent with legal rules governing consensual police-citizen
encounters. Moreover, press reports suggest that the procedures employed by FBI agents and other law enforcement officers during the interviews were consistent with controlling
legal precedents. Thus, the Attorney General and other high1" Remarks to U.S. Attorneys

Conference, 2001 Pub. Papers II, 1459, 1462

(Nov. 29, 2001).
Id. at 1461.
Attorney General John Ashcroft, Attorney General Ashcroft Announces Responsible Cooperators Program (Nov. 29, 2001) (transcript available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/2001/agcrisisremarksll_29.htm) (last accessed Feb.
27, 2004).
13 See generally Matthew Brezezinski, Hady Hassan Omar's Detention, N.Y.
TIMES MAGAZINE, Oct. 27, 2002, § 6 (Magazine), at 50 (describing a seventy-three
day detention in solitary confinement of an Egyptian, lawful resident alien).
"
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ranking officials could confidently assert that the interrogation
sessions did not violate any constitutional liberties."' The significant point, however, is that the constitutional standard the
federal government relied upon is "a sham."1 15 The "reason-

able person" test remains a hoax because it was never intended
to measure the reality of police-citizen encounters. For over two
decades, the Court has taken the position that a person approached and questioned by police officials will feel free to
disregard the officials, ignore their inquiries or terminate the
encounter. This conclusion-originally stated in United States
v. Mendenhall1 3 6-has

never been supported by empirical evi-

dence. Instead, the Court's judgment was a "prescriptive statement masquerading as a descriptive observation."" 7 Since
Mendenhall, the Court has adhered to the reasonable person
standard and Drayton continues this misguided approach despite extensive academic criticism."18 The Court's conclusion
in Drayton that no seizure occurred was not supported by empirical data; in fact, empirical data suggests that most people
would not feel free to terminate a police encounter under the
circumstances described in Drayton."9 When the Court de-

" For example, George Tenet, Director of the CIA, told a reporter:
[Als the attorney general has noted in the last month, the FBI has conducted nearly 10,000 interviews with current and former Iraqi citizens
residing here in the United States. All of these interviews were voluntary,
and all were conducted within the strict confines of the Constitution. And
they were conducted with the full respect to the rights and the dignity of
those who were contacted by our agents.
Operation Iraqi Freedom (MSNBC television broadcast, Apr. 17, 2003).
I" Nadler, supra note 104, at 214 (explaining that under "the current state of
the law, the [Supreme] Court's stated definitions of seizure and voluntary search
are a sham.").
'" 446 U.S. 544, 555 (1980) (plurality opinion). Although the "reasonable person" test was announced by a plurality opinion in Mendenhall, a majority of the
Court has reaffirmed that standard in subsequent cases. See Florida v. Bostick,
501 U.S. 429 (1991).
...James B. Jacobs & Nadine Strossen, Mass Investigations Without Individualized Suspicion: A Constitutional and Policy Critique of Drunk Driving Roadblocks, 18 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 595, 630 n.154 (1985).
138 See e.g., Stuntz, supra note 17; Tracey Maclin, The Decline of the Right of
Locomotion: The Fourth Amendment on the Streets, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1258,
1301 n.205 (1990) (listing academic criticism of the Court's analysis).
" See Nadler, supra note 104, at 165-93 (describing social science data on
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cides that a bus passenger feels free to ignore or decline cooperation with a police officer who places his face within inches of
the passenger, the Justices are simply "using only intuitive
reflections o[fl their own experience and.. the imagined experience of other citizens." " °
The outcome of Drayton reaffirms that the Court is not
interested in a realistic assessment of the voluntary nature of
police-citizen encounters. Like earlier precedents, Drayton
"lends itself to a rather chilling interpretation: that lower
courts are expected not to interfere with bus sweep procedures.""" If Drayton sends the message that the judiciary
should not inject a dose of "reality" into the bus sweep scenario,
it is fair to assume that the judiciary and other legal actors will
exercise a jaundiced eye when assessing the constitutionality of
the Justice Department interrogation sessions. If the Drayton
majority could casually assert that "bus passengers answer
officers' questions and otherwise cooperate not because of coercion but because the passengers know that their participation
enhances their own safety and the safety of those around
them,"' then federal judges will also be inclined to accept
the claim that Arab resident aliens cooperated with FBI agents
not because of coercion but because they believed that answering questions would enhance their own safety, as well as the
nation's security against future terrorist attacks. Furthermore,
since the threat of terrorism pervades the mindset of most
related issues).
140

Id.

at 165.

. Wayne R. LaFave, Pinguitudinous Police, Pachydermatous Prey: Whence
Fourth Amendment Seizures, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 729, 752 (1991).
142 Drayton, 536 U.S. at 205. In his dissent, Justice Souter criticizes the
majority's contention regarding the consent of travelers to baggage searches:
Anyone who travels by air today submits to searches of the person and
luggage as a condition of boarding the aircraft. It is universally accepted
that such intrusions are necessary to hedge against risks that, nowadays,
even small children understand. The commonplace precautions of air travel have not, thus far, been justified for ground transportation, however,
and no such conditions have been placed on passengers getting on trains
or buses. There is therefore an air of unreality about the Court's explanation that bus passengers consent to searches of their luggage to
"enhanc[e] their own safety and the safety of those around them."
Id. at 208 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
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Americans in the debate over law enforcement procedures,
federal judges may be more sympathetic to the same govern-

ment arguments that might have triggered skepticism from the
judiciary prior to September 11.143
Under current legal norms, a challenge to the Justice

Department's interrogation sessions will not succeed unless
FBI agents employed drastic and oppressive measures to ensure compliance with their "requests" for "voluntary" interviews. FBI agents and other police officers, however, will rarely
need to utilize such methods to achieve their objectives. To the
average person, an agent's "request" is the equivalent of a legal
command or order."' "For example, citizens generally do not
interpret 'Can I please see your license and registration?' as
spoken by a police officer as a genuine request; it is a command, and everyone understands this."14 The tactics described in Drayton that might trigger Fourth Amendment scrutiny-physical force, intimidating movements, overwhelming
show of authority, brandishing of weapons, blocking of exits,
threats, commands or authoritative tones of voices-are not
necessary for federal law enforcement.1 46 Unless FBI agents

"

Cf. Nadler, supra note 104, at 221.
It may be the case that, on balance, it is desirable to permit police to
board intercity buses and pose questions to passengers and, in some circumstances, conduct searches of baggage and persons, especially with the
current need to be vigilant about potential risks of terrorism. In this way,
it is understandable that the Drayton Court scrupulously avoided announcing rules in drug cases that would restrict the ability of police to
investigate terrorism and other serious threats to public security.

Id.
I" See Nadler, supra note 104, at 188 ("Because authorities such as police officers direct the actions of others, the listener is likely to conclude that an utterance is in fact a directive, or an order to be followed." (footnote omitted)).
145

Id.

" Relying on social science studies, Professor Nadler also observes that:
[A]uthority figures do not need to employ highly face-threatening language
to achieve their goal. In fact, a polite request is usually perceived by the
listener as being face-maintaining because the listener understands that
coercion may be used. Thus, a police officer who says, "Do you mind if I
search your bags?" is perceived as being more face-sensitive than one who
says, "I am going to search your bags"; at the same time, the listener in
both situations realizes he or she must comply with the message. Thus,
because a police officer is perceived as an authority, he need not rely on
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employed the severe methods seen in Kaupp-removing a person from his home or location, transporting him to the police
station and subjecting the person to an interrogation or other
investigative procedure-a Fourth Amendment challenge to the
Justice Department's interrogation sessions will not succeed.
Therefore, unless an Arab resident alien was subjected to the
functional equivalent of an arrest, constitutional jurisprudence
will consider his decision to participate in an interview with
FBI agents to have been consensual.

PART II: PROFILING AIRLINE PASSENGERS
The second example of law enforcement's use of ethnicity is
not yet the law, nor is it a de facto policy acknowledged by
government officials. Instead, it is a proposal advocated by
Stuart Taylor, Charles Krauthammer and others " 7 that airport security officials select passengers-presumably citizens
and non-citizens alike-on the basis of national origin for additional security. Stuart Taylor, for example, calls for a "welldesigned profiling system" that "would factor in suspicious
behavior, along with national origin, gender, and age. It could
spread the burden by selecting at least one white (or black, or
Asian) passenger to be searched for every Middle Easterner so
selected." " 8 According to Taylor, the "only real protection

coercive statements to achieve a goal-his role is adequate, and a polite
request can increase face-sensitivity without reducing coercive power ....
Because people perceive discourse originating from an authority to be
coercive regardless of assertive linguistic cues, authority figures need not
use highly face-threatening language-part of that burden is carried by
the badge and gun.
Id. at 188-89 (footnotes omitted).
147 See Alschuler, supra note 1, at 227 n.253 (citing sources). In August 2002,
the head of the Transportation Security Administration, James M. Loy, was reported to have said that profiling airline passengers "whose behavior or background raise red flags, should be seriously considered." Mac Daniel, Lay Sees Potential for Profiling, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 6, 2002, at B4.
'" Taylor, supra note 6. Taylor begins his proposal with an emotional appeal
to our survival instincts:
What would happen if another 19 well-trained Al Qaeda terrorists, this
time with 19 bombs in their bags, tried to board 19 airliners over the
next 19 months? Many would probably succeed, blowing up lots of planes
and thousands of people, if the forces of head-in-the sand political correct-
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[against future terrorism in the sky] is to make national origin
a key factor in choosing [which] bags [to search]. ""' Taylor
denies that he is suggesting that all Middle Easterners are terrorists. "The logic of profiling is to identify for more-careful
screening those small groups who, based on historical experience, seem more likely than others to include suicide bombers
(or just bombers). History tells us that all 19 of the September
11 suicide bombers, and most or all other terrorists known to
have murdered planeloads of people, have been Middle Eastern
50
men."'
Anticipating constitutional and political objections that
American citizens could not or should not be subjected to explicit ethnic-based searches, Taylor confidently claims that
"[mlillions of Arab-Americans would not fit the profile because
their American roots would be apparent-from their accents
and speech patterns-to trained security screeners.""'5 Taylor
also asserts there is a logical stopping point to his proposal. He
contends that racial profiling of blacks and Hispanics on the
highways is not cost-effective. 52 "Stopping people for 'driving

ness prevail-as they did before September 11-in blocking use of national origin as a factor in deciding which passengers' bag to search with extra care.
ld.
149

Id.

"o Id. (emphasis added).

. Id. In an earlier column, Taylor proposed targeting "Arab-looking people" at
the nation's airports for extra searches and screening. See Stuart Taylor, Jr., The
Case for Using Racial Profiling at Airports, NATL J., Sept. 22, 2001, available at
http://www.theatlantic.com/politicsfnj/taylor200l-09-25.htm
(last visited Feb. 27,
2004). In that proposal, Taylor asserted that ethnic profiling of Arabs at airports
satisfied constitutional norms:
[Tihe mathematical probability that a randomly chosen Arab passenger
might attempt to a mass-murder-suicide hijacking-while tiny-is considerably higher than the probability that a randomly chosen white, black,
Hispanic, or Asian passenger might do the same. In constitutional-law
parlance, while racial profiling may be presumptively unconstitutional,
that presumption is overcome in the case of airline passengers, because
the government has a compelling interest in preventing mass-murdersuicide hijackings, and because close scrutiny of Arab-looking people is
narrowly tailored to protect that interest.
Id.
152 Taylor, supra note 6. Of course, not everyone agrees with Taylor that racial
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while Arab' would be similarly unwarranted. [However,]
[fIlying while Middle1 5 3Eastern poses a dramatically different
cost-benefit calculus."

Similarly, Charles Krauthammer agrees with Taylor that
searching the bags of little old ladies is nothing more than
"political correctness."154 Krauthammer concedes that no system will catch every terrorist, however, he contends that
America's current airport security system "is designed to catch
no one because we are spending 90% of our time scrutinizing
people everyone knows are no threat."155 Finally,
Krauthammer asserts that "We all would rather not make any
calculations based on ethnicity, religion, gender or physical
characteristics-except that on airplanes our lives are at
stake."156
Taylor, Krauthammer and many legal scholars offer blunt,
profiling of blacks on the highways is not cost-effective. See, e.g., Jeffrey Goldberg,
The Color of Suspicion, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 1999, § 6 (Magazine), at 53-57
(comments of police officials on why officers profile); Dan Herbeck, Transit-Site
Drug Arrests Spur Racism Allegations, BUFFALO NEWS, Jan. 30, 1994, at 1 (quoting Depew, New York Police Chief John Maccarone: "We're dealing with either
blacks, Hispanics, Dominicans or Haitians. These are the couriers. We lean on
them heavily here .... Unfortunately, that's who the couriers are ... I don't
believe it's unfair. We have to do everything we can do to stop drugs from coming in. The honest, upright citizen-black or white-knows that what we are
doing is fair."); cf. Jodi Wilgoren, Police Profiling Debate Hinges on Issue of Experience of U.S. Bias, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 1999, at B7 (quoting former New York
City police commissioner William J. Bratton: "'Cops are profiling all the time,
your good cops; unfortunately, now that's developing a bad name .... Whether
they call it profiling, or street smarts, awareness-whatever the names might
be-profiling is essential.").
Taylor, supra note 6.
15 Krauthammer, supra note 6.
155

Id.

1

Id.

Krauthammer closes his essay with an emotional, yet practical, appeal

to common sense and public safety:
Airport security is not permitted to "racially" profile, but every passenger-white or black, male or female, Muslim or Christian-does. We scan
the waiting room, scrutinizing other passengers not just for nervousness
and shiftiness but also for the demographic characteristics of al-Qaeda.
We do it privately. We do it quietly. But we do it. Airport officials, however, may not. This is crazy. So crazy that it is only a matter of time
before the public finally demands that our first priority be real security,
not political appearances-and puts an end to this charade.
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gut-wrenching and practical arguments as to why airport security officials should be permitted to "profile" individuals of Arab
ancestry. 157 The terrorists of September 11 were all young
Middle Eastern men who killed many innocent people. Government officials warn of future terrorist attacks, and our survival
instincts tell us that the government's prediction that the next
round of terrorism will come from a Middle Eastern nation is
probably correct.'58 Although Taylor and Krauthammer's arguments may appeal to our common sense and understandable
desire for greater national security, I am still inclined to reject
their proposals for the following reasons.
First, Taylor and Krauthammer's assessment of current
airline security policies, which require the searching of
everyone's luggage, as "political correctness," falsely characterizes the constitutional issue at stake. The requirement that
airport officials search all luggage directly promotes values
central to the Fourth Amendment.15 9 A system that requires

157 See Malti-Douglas, supra note 6 ("Arab-Americans like me want to be safe
when we fly. Cooperating with security procedures, even when we suspect that we
are getting more attention than our fellow citizens, makes sense. Does anyone
really want a security official to hesitate before stopping a suspicious passenger
out of fear of an accusation of bias?"). Qf Stuntz, supra note 115, at 2179. Professor Stunts asserts that "racial and ethnic profiling is a fact of life that the
legal system probably cannot change." Moreover, Stuntz doubts that "an optimal
regime" would bar racial profiling. Id. He explains, "The inefficiency of treating
all airplane travelers the same-should airport security officials really regard
travels with Danish visas and travelers with Yemeni visas as equally risky?-is
both great and obvious. Reasonable people can differ about the balance, but one
could plausibly conclude that the efficiency gains from profiling outweigh the
harm from the ethnic tax that post-September 11 policing is imposing on young
men of Middle Eastern origin." Id. For a thoughtful and persuasive reply to
Stuntz's commentary on racial and ethnic profiling in a post-September 11 world,
see Davies, supra note 1, at 81-94.
"' "Sometimes the information [on potential terrorists] is very general-vague
talk, bragging about future attacks. Sometimes the information is more specific,
as in a recent case when an al Qaeda detainee said attacks were planned against
financial institutions . . . . [We now know that thousands of trained killers are
plotting to attack us, and this terrible knowledge requires us to act differently."
Overriding and Urgent Mission for New Agency, WASH. POST, June 7, 2002, at
A19 (containing transcript of President George W. Bush's speech on homeland
security delivered June 6, 2002).
' Cf. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 882 (1975) ("To approve
roving-patrol stops of all vehicles in the border area, without any suspicion that a
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universal examination of luggage (or individuals) forces airport
officials to be neutral, which protects the rights of all citizens
under the Fourth Amendment. Under such a system, particular
passengers are not subject to search based on "'the discretion of
the official in the field.""'6 By following neutral rules that apply to everyone, officials are not given the discretion to arbitrarily select Arab or Muslim passengers for search or detention.16 1 As Professor Alschuler has observed, "[b]urden sharing demonstrates to people of Arab ethnicity and others that
the hassles to which they are subjected do not flow from suspicion of their appearance or other invidious motives."'62
Second, I do not see a principled basis for limiting ethnicbased intrusions to the nation's airports.'
A biological or
chemical weapons attack at a major sporting event-for examparticular vehicle is carrying illegal immigrants, would subject the residents of
these and other areas to potentially unlimited interference with their use of the
highways, solely at the discretion of Border Patrol officers.").
16
LAFAVE, supra note 104, § 10.6(c), at 632 (quoting United States v. Davis,
482 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1973)). As Professor LaFave observes, under a system that
requires universal screening of all passengers, "all citizens who wish to use the
[airport] are subject to the same screening procedures," and they do not encounter
.social stigma . . . public ridicule or suspicion." Id. at § 10.6(e) at 639 (quoting
People v. Hyde, 524 P.2d 830, 843 (Cal. 1974)). Cf Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth
Amendment First Principles, 107 HARv. L. REV. 757, 809 (1994) ("A broader
search is sometimes better-fairer, more regular, more constitutionally reasonable-if it reduces the opportunities for official arbitrariness, discretion, and discrimination . . . . The broader, more evenhanded search is sometimes more constitutionally reasonable even if the probabilities are lower for each citizen
searched." (footnote omitted)).
16" See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 655 (1979) (invalidating random
stops of automobiles for purpose of checking license and registration because, inter
alia, random stops pose a risk that officers will abuse their discretion).
16
Alschuler, supra note 1, at 230.
1
In his earlier article, Stuart Taylor acknowledged the threats and "dangers
of terrorists smuggling bombs or guns or box cutters onto buses or trains or subways or bridges, or into tunnels or crowded stadiums or office buildings or
schools or the Capitol or Disneyland." Taylor, supra note 151. While conceding
that these "dangers are real," Taylor speculates that "in such settings, [the dangers] are as likely to be presented by domestic terrorists such as Timothy
McVeigh as by people of Arab descent." Id. Taylor wants us to believe that Arab
terrorists will insist on using airplanes to commit future acts of terrorism. "Only
by crashing airliners can terrorists commit mass murder with weapons as easily
concealed as box cutters and plastic knives. And only would-be mass murderers
bent on suicide-the vast majority of them extremist Islamic fanatics craving
martyrdom-would crash an airliner." Id.
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pie, at a future Egg Bowl between the Ole Miss Rebels and
Mississippi State, 1"I at a University of Tennessee football
game in Knoxville165 or at the Superbowl' 6 could kill many
more innocent people than the approximately 3,000 that died
on September 11.167 If the nation intends to make a serious
commitment to prevent future terrorism, the logic of Taylor
and Krauthammer suggests that government officials should
target Middle Eastern and Muslim men in and around any
event or activity with extraordinarily large groups of individuals. The release of a biological or chemical agent in the middle
of Times Square could also kill thousands of people.' 68 To prevent or reduce the chances of such a horrific attack, should
police officers stop and search all Middle Eastern men in and
around Times Square on New Year's Eve?' 69 Likewise, should

police officials stop and search all Middle Eastern men in and
around the federal buildings and historic landmarks in Washington, D.C.?
Consider the damage to both people and infrastructure if a
bomb or biological weapon detonated on one of the bridges or
tunnels leading into New York City. Applying Stuart Taylor's

'" Attendance of 60,245 at the Egg Bowl game between the University of
Mississippi and Mississippi State University on November 28, 2002, was the largest for an on-campus game in the 99-year history of the series and the fourthlargest ever at the time. Rusty Hampton, Bowl-Bound Rebs Finish Strong, Dump
Dogs 24-12, CLARION-LEDGER (Jackson, MS), Nov. 29, 2002, at Al.
165 The attendance record for Neyland Stadium, home to University of Tennessee football, is 108,768, which was set in 2000 against Florida. SEC Report, THE
ARKANSAS DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE (Little Rock, AR), Sept. 4, 2003, at 28.
" The attendance record for the Super Bowl is 103,985, which was set at
Super Bowl XIV at the Rose Bowl in Pasadena, California, in 1980. Super Bowl
Facts and Figures, VENTURA COUNTY STAR, Jan. 23, 2001, at C2.
" Because of the attacks on September 11, 2001, of the World Trade Center
site in New York City, 2,792 people died. Nation in Brief, WASH. POST, Mar. 14,
2003, at A28. Additionally, forty victims died during the plane crash in
Shanksville, Pennsylvania. Phil Hirschkorn, New York Adjusts Death Toll Downward, available at http://www.cnn.com/2002/US/08/22/911.toll/index.html (Aug. 22,
2002). At the Pentagon, 184 victims died during the September 11 attack. Id.
16 See generally Barry Kellman, Biological Terrorism: Legal Measures for Preventing Catastrophe, 24 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POLy 417 (2001).
16 Over 750,000 revelers attended the 2002-2003 New Year's Eve celebration
in Times Square of New York City. Party's Over, Cleanup Begins, ATLANTA J.CONST., Jan. 2, 2003, at A8.
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"cost-benefit" analysis, many individuals might favor stopping
and searching the vehicles of all Middle Easterners to prevent
such an attack. A biological or chemical attack on New York or
Chicago's subway system would also cause enormous damage.'7 Why not, on random days or during a high-security
alert period, separate Middle Easterners from other passengers
for extra screening at all subway entry points? According to the
"cost-benefit" analysis advocated by Stuart Taylor, detaining
and searching individuals "driving while Arab" "commuting
while Arab" or even "vacationing while Arab" is a sound policy
if the nation wants to take maximum steps to protect itself
against the next round of terrorist attacks.
The attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, also
caused enormous death and destruction. 17'1 In the aftermath
of that tragedy, government officials, including the President of
the United States, initiated a horrid race-based policy of detaining, searching and eventually forcibly removing and transporting thousands of Japanese aliens and Japanese-American
citizens from their homes on the West Coast to prison barracks
surrounded by barbed wire and armed guards who shot at and,
in some cases, killed individuals who tried to escape.172 In the
most disgraceful decisions rendered by the Court since Dred
Scott v. Sandford,7 1 the Court sustained these racist poli.70In Japan, a sarin gas attack in the Tokyo subway system killed twelve
people and left 5500 people ill. See Jun Sato Yomiuri Shimtun, Sarin Cleanup
Remembered, THE DAILY YOMIURI (Tokyo), Mar. 17, 2003, at 3 (reflecting on the
attack during its eight-year anniversary).
171 In the attack on Pearl Harbor, 2,390 Americans died. Scott Fornek, Bush:
We Have Seen First War of Century, CHI. SuN-TIMEs, Oct. 4, 2001, Extra Edition
at New Special Edition 2.
17 See generally ROBINSON, supra note 29; see also Muller, supra note 38, at
577-78. Professor Muller notes that the federal government "chose to ditch the
Fourth Amendment entirely in framing its search-and-seizure program" regarding
Japanese Americans and Japanese aliens in the aftermath of Pearl Harbor. Id. at
577. Muller also observes that by the autumn of 1942, the federal government
had transported both Japanese Americans and Japanese aliens by train to permanent camps in the Mountain West. "The euphemism for these facilities was 'relocation centers,' but everyone called them concentration camps. [Individuals of
Japanese ancestry] lived with neither comfort nor privacy in tarpaper barracks,
surrounded by barbed wire and guarded by U.S. Army sentries in guard towers
around the perimeter." Id. at 578.
1
60 U.S. 393 (1856).
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cies. 74 Hirabayashi v. United States'75 upheld the conviction
of an American citizen who violated a curfew order that applied
to all persons of Japanese ancestry living in certain areas of
the West Coast. Although Hirabayashimay have been intended
as a narrow ruling, 7 ' one year later in Korematsu v. United
States,'7 7 the Court upheld the conviction of another American citizen for violating an exclusion order that applied only to
individuals of Japanese ancestry. Speaking for a majority of the
Court, Justice Black insisted that Korematsu was excluded not
because of racial prejudice, but because the country was at war
with the government of Japan. 7 ' Deferring to military authorities, Justice Black further explained that military officials
feared an invasion of the West Coast and had decided that
military urgency "demanded that all citizens of Japanese ancestry be segregated from the West Coast temporarily."' 7 9 Justice
Black asserted that there was "evidence of disloyalty on the
part of some," and that military officials felt "the need for action was great" and the "time was short." 80
" See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943). Professor Muller has fittingly observed that:
[T]he Court has not overruled Korematsu primarily because it has not
needed to. But more importantly, to the extent that Korematsu stands at
all today, it stands as a deeply discredited decision. Eight of the nine
currently sitting Justices on the Court have either written or concurred in
opinions describing Korematsu as an error-even as spectacular an error
as the Court's Dred Scott decision.
Muller, supra note 38, at 586 (footnotes omitted).
1" 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
176 Dennis J. Hutchinson, "The Achilles Heel" of the Constitution: Justice
Jackson and the Japanese Exclusion Cases, 2002 SuP. CT. REV. 455, 465-67 (explaining how Court in Hirabayashi wanted to decide the constitutionality of the
curfew order on narrow grounds).
17 323 U.S. 214 (1994). On the same day Korematsu was decided, the Court
also decided Ex Parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944). Ex Parte Endo ruled that the
petitioner, an American citizen, was entitled to release from a government detention program that was established by the War Relocation Authority. Ex Parte
Endo was decided on statutory grounds; the Court did not reach the constitutionality of holding detaining persons of Japanese ancestry. Id. at 299. For excellent
legal critiques of the cases, see PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR (1983); Eugene V.
Rostow, The Japanese American Cases-A Disaster, 54 YALE L.J. 489 (1945).
178 Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 223.
179

Id.

'8' Id. at 223-24.
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While Justice Black insisted that the government's racebased exclusion order was not generated by racial or ethnic
hostility, there were good reasons to doubt this conclusion.
Even a cursory review of the events and evidence available to
the Court in 1944 revealed that racial bias permeated the
government's actions toward individuals of Japanese ancestry.
For example, prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, President
Roosevelt had already received reports confirming the loyalty of
Japanese American citizens on the West Coast.' s After the
attack, however, high-ranking government officials (and eventually President Roosevelt) rejected loyalty hearings for people
of Japanese ancestry because it was impossible to determine
loyal Japanese from disloyal ones.182 Similar discriminatory
treatment was evident when
military authorities imposed dusk-to-dawn curfews on American citizens of Japanese ancestry living in a wide swath of
territory along the West Coast, and also forbade them from
traveling more than five miles from their homes without permission. No such restrictions were imposed on American citizens of German or Italian ancestry anywhere in the United
States. 183

181ROBINSON, supra note 19, at 67-68. Prior to war with Japan, President
Roosevelt:
had received FBI reports about the nature of the local Japanese community in Hawaii, and he had his own secret intelligence network report on
the loyalty of West Coast Japanese Americans. He was again assured by
the FBI and his special investigators after Pearl Harbor that Japanese
Americans were loyal and that there was no evidence of sabotage in Hawaii. However, he chose not to accept such findings.
Id. at 114.
1" Id. at 120 ("[President] Roosevelt's words and actions both before and after
Pearl Harbor, when taken in their entirety, point to his acceptance of the idea
that Japanese Americans, whether citizens or longtime resident aliens, were still
Japanese at the core. He regarded them as presumptively dangerous and disloyal
on racial grounds."); id. at 161 (noting different approach of Roosevelt Administration regarding loyalty hearings for German and Italian aliens on East Coast and
its approach to loyalty hearings for Japanese American citizens: military officials
on West Coast rejected hearings for Japanese Americans because "[niot only
would such hearings be too time-consuming but, as one military lawyer stated,
they would undermine the basis of the evacuation-that is was impossible to
distinguish between loyal and disloyal Japanese Americans").
18 Muller, supra note 38, at 577.
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Along the same lines, President Roosevelt rejected a military
request to remove West Coast Italian and German aliens en
masse, and he specifically refused to permit any evacuation of
Italian or German aliens living on the East Coast despite the
greater number of submarine sinkings on the East Coast than
the West Coast."" On January 31, 1944, eleven months before
the Court decided Korematsu, the army re-instituted selective
service on Japanese Americans.185 At the same time the army
was drafting some Japanese Americans to fight in the war,
military officials were also ordering the imprisonment of other
Japanese American citizens in concentration camps. 86 Finally, the military commander responsible for implementing the
exclusion order revealed the most persuasive evidence available
to support the contention that the exclusion order in Korematsu
was based on racial antagonism. On April 13, 1943, Lieutenant
General John L. DeWitt told Congress the following:
I don't want any of them (persons of Japanese ancestry) here.
They are a dangerous element. There is no way to determine
their loyalty. . . . It makes no difference whether he is an
American citizen, he is still a Japanese. American citizenship
does not necessarily determine loyalty ....
But we must worry about the Japanese all the time until he is wiped off the
map. Sabotage and espionage will make problems as long as
he is allowed in this area.... 187

ROBINSON, supra note 19, at 111-12.
Ild. at 209.

188 Id.

187 Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 236 n.2 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (quoting Hearing
Before the House Naval Affairs Subcommittee to Investigate Congested Areas, 78th
Cong. 739-40 (1943) (testimony of Lt. Gen. John L. DeWitt)). Although Justice
Murphy does not include General DeWitt's other comments in his dissent, General
DeWitt's testimony to Congress also included the following statement, which was
made available to the Court: "A Jap is a Jap. It makes no difference whether he
is an American citizen or not." Brief of Amicus Curiae Japanese Americans Citizes League at 198, Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), reprinted
in 42 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 309-530 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper
eds., 1975). See also Mark Tushnet, Defending Korematsu?: Reflections on Civil
Liberties in Wartime, 2003 Wis. L. REV. 273, 288 ("General John L. DeWitt, the
West Coast military commander, was a racist who simply assumed, without evi-
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I fully recognize that up until now, most Arab Americans
and lawful resident aliens from Arab and Muslim countries
have not been subjected to the same scale of human rights
abuses that our government imposed on Japanese aliens and
Japanese Americans in the 1940s."ss A plausible argument

dence, that Japanese Americans posed a threat of sabotage and espionage."). History would reveal that government officials deliberately manipulated the evidence
that was given to the Supreme Court. See Korematsu v. United States, 584 F.
Supp. 1406, 1417-19 (N.D. Cal. 1994). For example, in the original version of his
Final Report on the evacuation and exclusion of Japanese persons from the West
Coast, General DeWitt explained that his racially-based implementation of the
exclusion order was "because it was impossible to distinguish loyal from disloyal
Japanese Americans and that lack of time for hearings had not been a factor in
his decision." ROBINSON, supra note 19, at 184-85. After Assistant Secretary of
War John McCloy received General DeWitt's report, he ordered all copies of the
report be "destroyed, and he forced DeWitt to write a revised version adopting
the more defensible position" on the justifications for the exclusion order. Id. at
185. For a detailed discussion on how high-ranking government officials manipulated the publication and release of DeWitt's report, with an eye toward influencing the results in the Japanese internment cases, see IRONS, supra note 177, at
206-18.
18 See Muller, supra note 38, at 581 (acknowledging "very real indignities, and
in some cases the very real terror and violence, that Arab and Muslim Americans
have actually endured ....
But the fact is that the past five months [since September 11, 2001] do not match the scale of the civil rights tragedy that followed
Pearl Harbor."). While there has not been the type of wide-scale civil liberties
abuse against the entire Arab-American or Arab-alien communities, there has been
deliberate effort to target aliens from Arab and Muslim countries, and there have
been many abuses of civil liberties against individuals from Arab and Muslim nations. See generally COLE, supra note 5. Relying on government records, Professor
Cole reports that as of May 2003, approximately 5,000 persons from Arab and
Muslim nations had been permanently detained by the federal government. Professor Cole observes that of the more than 5000 people detained,
not one has been charged with any involvement in the crimes of September 11. The only person actually charged with the September 11 attacks,
Zacarias Moussaoui, was arrested before September 11, and therefore is
not part of the roundup. Only five detainees (three noncitizens from the
initial wave and two citizens picked up later as material witnesses) have
been charged with any terrorist-related crime. Of those five, one has been
convicted of conspiracy to support terrorism; two were acquitted on all
terrorism charges; the government dropped all terrorism charges against
the fourth when he pleaded guilty to a minor infraction; and the fifth is
awaiting trial. . . . Thus, by the government's own account, nearly all the
thousands it has detained in the war on terrorism have turned out to
have nothing to do with terrorism.
Id. at 25-26 (footnote omitted); see also Brzezinski, supra note 133 (describing sev-
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can be made that the Bush administration "has not seen fit to
lead with extreme assertions" in the aftermath of September
11.189

Moreover, reasonable persons can debate whether the
federal government "has proceeded from a premise of moderation, and has not had to be forced to that position by the pressure of public protest." 9 ° However, if government officials authorize the detention and search of Middle Eastern men based
on ethnicity, they act under the same premise that motivated
the detention of Japanese Americans and aliens and defy the
same constitutional principle that was violated in the 1940s. As
one historian of the Japanese internment era noted, "Japanese
Americans were singled out from other 'enemy' groups such as
Italian Americans and German Americans as innately untrustworthy on racial grounds." 9 '
If government officials implement Taylor and
Krauthammer's proposal to target people of Arab ancestry for
search and seizure at the nation's airports, the nation should
be candid about our actions. These tactics stem from a belief
that young Middle Eastern men will perpetrate future terrorist
attacks on our country. To prevent future attacks, therefore,

enty-three day detention of Egyptian alien). See also Davies, supra note 1, at 49-50
("Despite the government assurances, however, fear for the rights of Arab-Americans grew as the soothing words of these public officials began to collide with
information that federal agents had in fact begun to round up persons of MiddleEastern descent and place them under arrest. In a little over a month, the number
of people taken into federal custody mushroomed from dozens, to hundreds, to over
one thousand." (footnotes omitted)). Davies notes that Middle Eastern descent was
the "most common denominator among those arrested or subjected to questioning."
Id. at 50 n.24.
188 Muller, supra note 38, at 591. Professor Muller notes:
In the terror and panic of mid-September, the administration might have
proposed all manner of restrictions on aliens from Arab and Muslim countries, or even on American citizens of Arab ancestry or Muslim faith. The
mind boggles at the possibilities: prohibitions on piloting or traveling on
airplanes, bans on crossing bridges or entering skyscrapers, residential
curfews, forced relocation or deportation, wholesale detention and interrogation of all aliens from particular nations.
Id.

190 Id.

191 ROBINSON, supra note 19, at 3.
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airport security officials should detain and search all Middle
Eastern men or those who appear to be Middle Eastern, Arab,
or Muslim. The bottom line is that Middle Easterners and
Arabs cannot be trusted. These persons are a threat to our
safety not because of legitimate evidence of ties to terrorist
networks or a particularized suspicion that an individual poses
a threat as a terrorist but solely because of their nationality.
The government's internment of Japanese Americans in
the 1940s stemmed from a similar logic. The Germans and
Italians did not attack Pearl Harbor, the nation of Japan did.
Some government officials genuinely feared that the Japanese
would follow with an attack on the West Coast. It was imperative that the government take steps to eliminate or diminish
the enemy's opportunities for future attacks. Federal officials
believed that Japanese aliens and Japanese Americans were
the logical source of assistance to the nation of Japan. After all,
Japan had attacked Pearl Harbor. Therefore, government officials erroneously assumed, and the Court subsequently affirmed, that persons of Japanese ancestry in this country-to
paraphrase Stuart Taylor's words--"seem much more likely
than others"192 to assist in future attacks.
This method of assessing potential threats to national
security was wrong in the 1940s, and it is wrong today. More
importantly, it violates constitutional principles embodied in
the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment guarantees
everyone a right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures. When the government subjects individuals to search
and seizure based on their national origin rather than objective, incriminating evidence, the government acts unreasonably. 93 If our government continues to authorize interroga12 Taylor, supra note 6. As Eugene Rostow has noted, in Korematsu the Court
"solemnly accepted and gave the prestige of its support to dangerous racial myths
about a minority group, in arguments which can be applied easily to any other
minority in our society." Rostow, supra note 177, at 504.
1" In recent years, there has been an enormous (and enlightening) amount of
legal scholarship explaining why racial and ethnic factors should not play a role
in an officer's decision to seize or search a person. See, e.g., HARRIS, supra note
10; Anthony C. Thompson, Stopping the Usual Suspects: Race and the Fourth
Amendment, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 956 (1999); Harris, supra note 17; David A. Harris, Factors for Reasonable Suspicion: When Black and Poor Means Stopped and
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tions, and eventually orders searches and seizures, based on
Arab or Middle Eastern ancestry, many persons of Arab descent will adopt the attitude of many black Americans who
believe that the Fourth Amendment rarely protects them from
arbitrary and selective law enforcement tactics. Blacks typically
perceive their status vis-A-vis the police as a "second-class"
citizenship.1" If this happens to Arab Americans or legal
aliens of Arab descent, our nation may feel slightly safer, but
our constitutional freedoms will pay the price.
CONCLUSION
The horrible events of September 11, 2001 have confronted
the nation with many difficult issues. This essay discussed two
situations regarding the use of ethnicity to investigate and prevent future terrorism. The Bush Administration's decision to
interview 5000 Arab aliens living in the United States was
ethnic profiling. Although the selection process relied primarily
on ethnicity, administration officials had legal support for their
procedures. Regrettably, the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has tolerated racial and ethnic profiling by
law enforcement officials, and it is unlikely that any judge
would find that the "voluntary" interviews constituted seizures
under the Constitution.
In contrast to Bush Administration officials, Stuart Taylor
and Charles Krauthammer candidly admit that their proposal
for searching Middle Eastern men at the nation's airports is
focused on ethnicity, pure and simple. In Taylor's words, Arab
and other Middle Eastern males should be targeted for search
because, "based on historical experience, [they] seem more
likely than others to include suicide bombers (or just bombers)."19 5 Taylor and Krauthammer's proposal should be resistFrisked, 69 IND. L.J. 659 (1994); Sheri Lynn Johnson, Race and the Decision to
Detain a Suspect, 93 YALE L.J. 214 (1983).
19 As New York Times editorial writer Brent Staples puts it: "With reason,
African-Americans tend to grow up believing that the law is the enemy, because
those who are sworn to uphold the law so often enforce it in a biased way."
Brent Staples, Editorial Notebook: Growing Up to Fear the Law, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
28, 1991, at A24.
" Taylor, supra note 6.
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ed for many reasons, not the least of which is that it undermines a central value of the Fourth Amendment: deterring the
discretion of officers in the field. Although they denied it,
Taylor and Krauthammer's proposal also has no limiting principle; if the goal of ethnic profiling in airports is to save as many
lives as possible, then their proposal should extend to major
entertainment events, other public transportation facilities and
any venue in which large numbers of people congregate.
Although many reasonable persons might resist the charge,
this essay has endeavored to show that the Bush
Administration's interviews of Middle Eastern aliens, and
Taylor and Krauthammer's proposal for ethnic profiling in
airports, proceed along the same premise that motivated the
detention of Japanese Americans and aliens in the 1940s. Just
as persons of Japanese ancestry were deemed untrustworthy
after the Pearl Harbor attack, young men of Middle Eastern
and Arab ancestry are presumed untrustworthy today. In my
view, ethnic profiling was wrong then, and it is wrong now.

